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Articles
The Judicial Philosophy of Roger Traynor
by
JOHN W. POULOS*
I. Introduction
Roger Traynor served on the Supreme Court of California for
nearly thirty years, from July 31, 1940, through January 31, 1970, first
as an associate justice and then as Chief Justice.' In those years he
acquired an extraordinary reputation. Colleagues on the bench, in
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. A.B. Stanford University, 1958;
J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1962. The research for this
article started during the summer of 1991, while I was the inaugural Roger Traynor Sum-
mer Research Professor at Hastings College of the Law. The Roger Traynor Summer Re-
search Professorship enabled me to undertake this project. The remainder of the research
was carried out during the summers of 1992 and 1993 at Martin Luther King, Jr., Law
School, University of California, Davis.
I would like to thank the Hastings faculty for providing me with valuable insights
about Roger Traynor. I would also like to thank the librarians at Hastings for their invalu-
able assistance. My wife, Deborah Nichols Poulos, deserves special thanks for her support
throughout the term of this project, and for reading and commenting on the manuscript.
1. Roger Traynor became the seventy-seventh associate justice of the California
Supreme Court on August 13, 1940. He was appointed to the position by Governor
Culbert Olson on July 31, 1940. 15 Cal. 2d iii n.4 (1940); 1975 OFFICE OF STATE PRINTING,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA BLUE BOOK 264-65 (1974) [hereinafter 1975 CALI-
FORNIA BLUE BooK]; 2 J. EDwARD JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SuPREmE COURT Jus-
TICES OF CALIFORNIA, 1900-1950, at 182-193 (1966). His tenure on the Court begins with
the 16th volume of the second series of the Official California Supreme Court Reports.
Justice Traynor began his career as a teacher, initially in Berkeley's Department of
Political Science and later at Boalt Hall, where he spent ten years as a tax professor before
he joined the Court. At the time of his appointment to the Court, he was Professor of Law
and Acting Dean at Boalt Hall, the Law School at the University of California, Berkeley.
Id. at 191.
On September 1, 1964, he became the twenty-third Chief Justice of California. He
was appointed Chief Justice by Governor Edmund G. ("Pat") Brown, Sr. in 1964. 1975
CALIFORNIA BLUE BooK, supra, at 264-65; 2 JOHNSON, supra, at 207. Chief Justice Tray-
nor retired on February 1, 1970. 1975 CALIFORNIA BLUE BOOK, supra, at 265. On retire-
ment he accepted a position as professor of law at the University of California's Hastings
College of the Law, where he remained for the next decade. James R. McCall, Roger
Traynor: Teacher, Jurist, and Friend, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 741, 741-43, 746 (1984).
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both state and federal courts, refer to him as "one of the great con-
temporary figures of the law;"'2 as "the ablest judge of his generation
in the United States;" 3 and as an "outstanding common law judge,"
whose reputation extends throughout the common law world.4 Law
professors assess his work in equally complimentary terms: "Roger
Traynor is a law professor's judge;" 5 he is "one of the great judges and
legal reformers in the history of the common law;"16 and his contribu-
tions "can be compared only to those made by earlier masters of the
judicial craft, such as Shaw or Cardozo."'7 Lawyers8 and members of
For ease of expression, I generally refer to Roger Traynor as "Justice Traynor"
throughout this article, even though he may have been Chief Justice of California at the
time under discussion. There is, as yet, no published book-length biography of Roger Tray-
nor. A brief biography appears in JOHNSON, supra, at 265. For an interesting short bio-
graphical article by one of his colleagues at Hastings College of the Law, see McCall,
supra. Another brief autobiographical sketch appears in ROGER J. TRAYNOR, Many
Worlds Times You, in THE TRAYNOR READER 11-18 (Hastings Law Journal ed., 1987)
(Baccalaureate Address at the University of Utah on June 9, 1963).
Chief Justice Traynor is also the subject of a series of audiotape interviews with a
number of his friends, colleagues, and associates (including Donald P. Barrett, Research
Attorney, Supreme Court of California (1948-1981), and Justice Raymond L. Sullivan).
The interviews were conducted by Dorothy Mackay-Collins, the Curator/Archivist with
primary responsibility for the Roger J. Traynor Memorial Room in the Law Library at the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law. These interviews are part of an oral
history project on Chief Justice Traynor conducted by Ms. Mackay-Collins. These oral
history materials are on file in the Law Library's Roger J. Traynor Memorial Room.
There are several bibliographies of Traynor's work. These include the following:
ROGER J. TRAYNOR MEMORIAL ROOM, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW, ROGER J.
TRAYNOR CHRONOLOGICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 1900-1983 (Nous Verrons Series, undated);
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL, THE TRAYNOR READER 299-302 (1987); James E. Sabine &
Robert S. Clark, The Writings of Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 561.
2. Warren E. Burger, A Tribute, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (1983) (Tribute to Tray-
nor by the Chief Justice of the United States).
3. Henry J. Friendly, Ablest Judge of His Generation, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1039
(1983) (Tribute by the Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit).
4. Walter V. Schaefer, A Judge's Judge, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1050, 1050 (1983) (Tribute
by the Retired Justice, Supreme Court of Illinois). On Chief Justice Traynor's retirement
in 1970, his colleague on the California Supreme Court, Associate Justice Matthew 0. To-
briner, called Traynor "the outstanding state court judge of this generation." Matthew 0.
Tobriner, Chief Justice Roger Traynor, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1772 (1970).
5. Harry Kalven, Jr., Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CAL. L. REV.
189, 189 (1965).
6. McCall, supra note 1, at 741.
7. Bernard Schwartz, The Judicial Ten: America's Greatest Judges, 1979 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 405, 440. There is also a chapter on Traynor in G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL TRADITION 292-316 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Donald P. Barrett, Master of Judicial Wisdom, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1060
(1983) (tribute by senior attorney who was on Justice Traynor's staff from 1949 until Tray-
nor's retirement in 1970); Bill Blum, Toward A Radical Middle, Has A Great Court Become
Mediocre?, 77 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 48, 49 (analysis by Los Angeles attorney of tempera-
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the press9 offer similar appraisals.
Roger Traynor's exemplary reputation is based upon the nearly
900 opinions he wrote during his years on the bench,'0 and upon his
mastery of the judicial process. "The span of Traynor's creative con-
tributions to the case law of California," Justice Tobriner commented,
"is staggering."" His opinions embrace every legal topic heard by the
court from the start of the Second World War until after Astronaut
Neil Armstrong stepped out of Apollo 11 onto the surface of the
moon on July 20, 1969. He illuminated and modernized virtually
every field of law he touched.12 Hundreds of pages of scholarly com-
mentary analyze these opinions;' 3 and generations of law students
have pondered them in casebooks on contracts, torts, criminal law,
property, family law, and conflicts of law.
ment of California Supreme Court, serving in that position since Gibson-Traynor court);
Stanley A. Twardy, Jr., Justice Roger J, Traynor and the Development of Strict Liability in
Products Liability Cases, 53 CoNN. B.J. 423 (1979) (study of Traynor's instrumental role in
the development of tort law by attorney staff member of the Select Committee on Small
Business, U.S. Senate).
9. See, e.g., A Pioneer Retires, TIME, Jan. 19, 1970, at 63 (describing Traynor as a
"fount of creative federalism" whose opinions "often put the California Supreme Court far
ahead of the U.S. Supreme Court on [certain] issues.. ."); Gene Blake, California Chief
Justice Traynor to Retire January 31, L.A. TMrns, Jan. 3, 1970, § 2, at I (describing Traynor's
many honors and his time on court).
10. Justice Traynor wrote 892 reported opinions. Elizabeth Roth, The Two Voices of
Roger Traynor, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 269, 270 (1983).
11. Tobriner, supra note 4, at 1770.
12. For example, Justice Traynor's opinions in conflicts, torts, contracts, and taxation
have been the subject of extensive commentary. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Justice Traynor
and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. RIv. 719 (1961) (tracing Traynor's contribution to
field of conflict of laws); Herma Hill Kay, Chief Justice Traynor and Choice of Law Theory,
35 HASTINGs L.J. 747 (1984) (same); Adrian A. Kragen, Chief Justice Traynor and the Law
of Taxation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (1984) (taxation); Stewart Macaulay, Justice Traynor and
the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REv. 812 (1961) (contracts); Wex S. Malone, Contrasting
Images of Torts-The Judicial Personality of Justice Traynor, 13 STAN. L. REv. 779 (1961)
(torts).
13. A number of symposia focus on Traynor and his work. See Symposium, In
Memoriam-Roger J. Traynor, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 741 (1984); Symposium, In Memoriam-
RogerJ. Traynor, 71 CAL. L. Rnv. 1037 (1983); Symposium Honoring Roger J. Traynor, 44
S. CAL. L. REv. 876A (1971); Dedicated Issue Honoring Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor, 53
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1965); Symposium, Associate Justice Roger J. Traynor, 13 STAN. L. Rnv.
717 (1961). Justice Traynor's work was also a major theme in the following articles (or
book chapters): G. EDWARD WHrrE, Rationality and Intuition in the Process of Judging:
Roger Traynor, in THE AMERICAN JuDIciA TRADITON 292, 292-316 (1976); Louis H.
Burke, In Memoriam: Chief Justice Roger Traynor, 14 PAC. L. No. 4, at viii-ix (1983);
Robert A. Leflar, Roger J. Traynor-Exemplar of the Judicial Process, 1971 UTAH L. REv.
1; Roth, supra note 10; at 269; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 438-42; G. Edward White, Roger
Traynor, 69 VA. L. REv. 1381 (1983); Eleanor M. Fox, A Century Of Tort Law: Holmes,
Traynor, And Modern Times, 25 TRIAL, July 1989, at 78, 83.
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Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since Justice Traynor
wrote his last opinion. It has been a decade since he died. This Arti-
cle provides a new look at the judicial philosophy that produced this
remarkable legacy. The Article focuses on Justice Traynor's judicial
philosophy as found in twenty-four articles 14 that he wrote between
1956 and 1980.15
This Article begins with a brief review of the major developments
in American legal process theory from the latter part of the last cen-
14. The articles are listed in Appendix A. Roger Traynor first began writing about
the judicial process in the middle of his judicial career. The first article was published in
the summer of 1956, after Justice Traynor had served on the California Supreme Court for
sixteen years. Traynor was one of the invited speakers at the dedication of the new College
of Law building at the University of Illinois on April 12-14, 1956. He spoke at a collo-
quium held on Friday, April 13, on the theme "Law and Society." William W. Lewers,
Foreword, Dedicatory Proceedings-The New Law Building, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 163, 163.
Justice Traynor's talk was published that summer in a symposium issue of the law review
covering the dedication proceedings. Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Dem-
ocratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230 [hereinafter Traynor, Law and Social Change]. By
that time, he was one of the most respected state court judges in the nation. It was because
of this reputation that he was invited, along with Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Walter
V. Schaefer, Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, and others to partici-
pate in the ceremony. See Lewers, supra, at 163-64. The talk given by Justice Traynor at
this ceremony became his first law review article on the legal process. His next legal pro-
cess article, published the following year, was taken from an invited address given before
the University of Chicago Law School's Conference on Judicial Administration on Novem-
ber 8, 1956. Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions On The Work Of State Appellate
Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (1957) [hereinafter Traynor, Some Open Questions]. In
1961, the Stanford Law Review published a symposium issue on Justice Traynor. In that
issue, Chief Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois (Justice Schaefer
became Chief Justice after the University of Illinois ceremony dedicating the new law
school building mentioned above) wrote:
The legal profession is a busy one, and often recognition of the truly great among
us is too long deferred. This symposium will embarrass Justice Traynor, but I
think we need not be concerned with that. Whether he is willing to believe it or
not, the fact is that he has been for many years the nation's number one state-
court judge, and when the legal profession honors him, it honors itself.
Schaefer, supra note 13, at 718.
Justice Traynor's last article was published in 1980. Roger J. Traynor, Transatlantic
Reflections on Leeways and Limits of Appellate Courts, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 255 [hereinaf-
ter Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections]. With one exception, each of the twenty-four articles
was first delivered Ps an invited lecture. The single exception is the short article he pre-
pared for a history of the justices of the Supreme Court of California. Roger J. Traynor,
The Supreme Court's Watch on the Law, in J. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 207 [hereinafter
Traynor, Watch On the Law].
15. As a general proposition, beyond the customary techniques of statutory construc-
tion and the manipulation of precedent, our conception of the well-written opinion pre-
cludes discussion and analysis of the process that produced the law governing the case.
One can imagine that in past times, when judges adhered to Blackstone's view that judges
find the law and do not make it, it would have been embarrassing and highly inconvenient
to discuss the judge's method for finding the law. These traditions pass slowly. Customa-
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tury to the Traynor years on the court. First, traditional views of the
judicial process will be explored in Part II. Part III focuses on modem
(meaning twentieth-century) judges' movement away from those
traditional views. All of these views, both traditional and modem, are
the theories that provoked Roger Traynor to create his philosophy of
the judicial process. Then, in Part IV, Justice Traynor's judicial philos-
ophy is explored in detail and examined for its relevance for our time.
This portion of the Article focuses on Justice Traynor's view of judg-
ing as a creative process, and the factors and limitations which drive
the art of creative judging.
H. The raditional Views of the Judicial Process
There is no single traditional view of the judiciary's legitimate
role in the legal process. There is, instead, a spectrum of views that
vary according to the weight attributed to each component of the judi-
cial role. Like multiple-factor balancing analysis so common to con-
temporary constitutional law, different results are reached when the
components are weighted differently. 16 However, the different con-
ceptions of the judiciary's role share some common ground. As we
shall see, for example, Roger Traynor's views are consonant in some
respects with those espoused by Sir William Blackstone.
It is a foundational idea of our legal system that when people
come before a court to resolve a dispute, it is the law, not the judge,
that governs their affairs and their real world abstractions (such as
government, partnerships, and corporations). This separation of the
law from the person who enforces it is a common theme in varying
views of the Anglo-American legal process. It is a major part of what
rily, an opinion's purpose and focus is too narrow to permit exploration of law not neces-
sary to resolve the dispute before the court. Opinions are meant to decide the case before
the court, and to convince the parties and the public that justice was done. They are reac-
tive to the issues presented by counsel, and those issues seldom involve questions of legal
method. The process by which a judge decides the case thus is not usually discussed in a
judicial opinion. Even a casual reading of the Traynor opinions shows he agreed with these
constraints in basic form. Although his opinions sometimes, and perhaps frequently, al-
lude to legal process issues, none of them extensively or systematically explore judicial
methods. For that reason, I have relied exclusively on his extrajudicial writings for his
theories on the judicial process. A second article analyzes how he employed these theories
to decide cases during his long career on the bench. John W. Poulos, The Judicial Process
and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Legacy of Roger Traynor, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
(forthcoming Jan. 1996).
16. For recent discussions of contemporary multi-factor balancing analysis see, e.g., T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943
(1987); David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1994).
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we mean by the "rule of law." In extreme manifestations of this idea,
the judges apply or enforce the law solely as it was received from
others.
In times long past the law was believed to be handed down by
some source external to both the people and the judges: by God, na-
ture, the king, kismet, or (in less benign situations) by force of arms.
We need not trace the evolution of these ideas here, for it will suffice
for our purpose to accept that the law applied by the judges was un-
derstood to come from a source external to the judge. The growth of
other concepts, such as "legitimacy," "the people," and "democracy,"
limited the sources of law to a handful of choices.
The rise of the power and prestige of parliaments, insofar as they
are founded on the democratic ideal of the power of the people to
fashion their own destiny, ultimately established a fundamental princi-
ple of the Anglo-American legal system: Assuming away the modern
complications created by American constitutionalism, statutory law is
the supreme law of the land. It trumps the official acts, proclamations,
and judgments of administrators and judges alike. It is the law judges
must apply. According to this theory, the people, speaking through
their democratically elected legislature, are the sources of the law ap-
plied by the courts. Thus, when judges apply statutory law, there is no
debate about the sources of the law or its legitimacy, for this judicial
action falls squarely within accepted democratic theory. But what is
to be done when no legislative rule is available to resolve the dispute
at hand? Judges, it was early agreed, must decide disputes properly
submitted to them. Courts cannot turn litigants away to seek a legisla-
tive rule for application some later day. Decide the case they must!
But how?
William Blackstone provides us with one of the most enduring
and influential answers to the question. While acknowledging the pri-
macy of statutory law in the English legal system,17 Sir William as-
serted that judges must also apply the leges non scriptae, the unwritten
common law, as it is contained in judicial decisions and in the treatises
of learned sages of the profession:
[The] ... leges non scriptae ... receive their binding power, and the
force of laws, by long and immemorial usage, and by their universal
reception throughout the kingdom.' 8 ... [H]ow are these customs
17. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *89 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803). The
St. George Tucker edition of Blackstone's Commentaries is used in this Article because it
is one of the most famous editions to be published in America. Tucker's notes in this
edition (which are clearly identified) are an invaluable source of American legal history.
18. Id. at *63.
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or maxims to be known, and by whom is their validity to be deter-
mined? The answer is, by the judges in the several courts of justice.
They are the... living oracles, who ... are bound by an oath to
decide according to the law of the land .... And indeed these judi-
cial decisions are the principal and most authoritative evidence, that
can be given, of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part
of the common law.... For it is an established rule to abide by
former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation;
as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to
waver with every new judge's opinion; as also because the law in
that case... is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to
his private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according
to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and
customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound the old one. Yet this rule admits of excep-
tion, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to
reason; much more clearly if it be clearly contrary to the divine law.
But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to
make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresenta-
tion. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd
or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but
that it was not law; that is, it is not the established custom of the
realm, as has been erroneously determined. 19
"Where the common law and a statute, differ," Sir William finally ob-
served, "the common law gives place to the statute. '20
The supremacy of legislation did not develop in a vacuum. It
grew in the same soil that nurtured the common law in England, and
later in America. The common law was part of the environment in
which legislative supremacy grew and prevailed. The ideas that pro-
duced democracy harmonized that institution with the common law,
and created the supremacy of legislation to make both institutions, the
common law and parliamentary democracy, consistent. Indeed, the
common law would be integrated with democratic theory by insisting
that it was based, like legislation, upon the will of the people and their
values. The sources of the common law were thus later said to be the
traditions of the people, their customs and practices, and community
values. It is law based upon a common culture and its common values.
But should there be a conflict between statutory law and common law,
democratic theory made parliamentary law prevail.
These old conventions persisted, in one form or another and with
varying vigor, into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Judges, we
are told, apply the law. They do not make it. The law anciently was
19. ld. at *69-70.
20. Id. at *89.
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"made" by the people from their traditions, customs, practices, and
community values. The judge simply discovers that law and applies it
in the case at hand. As cases are decided, a body of precedent,
grounded in these sources, accumulates in the books. With the growth
of precedent, a judge need not generally be concerned with "discover-
ing" the law governing the case. The common law, embodied in pre-
cedent, can be applied with reason and the judge's lawyering skills to
resolve most of the legal issues coming before the court.
For the most part, the voyage of discovery begins and ends in the
law library: The search becomes research. And in the exceptional sit-
uation, "where the former determination is most evidently contrary to
reason" or "to ... divine law,"21 precedent may be overruled. But this
is done not on the ground that the law articulated in the precedent
was incorrect or moribund, but on the theory that overruled precedent
incorrectly evidenced the common law.
Novel cases, of course, present special problems: they cannot
easily be resolved by precedent alone. However, by a combination of
legal reasoning and other skills (such as, for example, the fine art of
distinguishing cases on their facts), precedent usually can be forced to
yield a rule for novel cases as well. When this is thought to be either
impossible or inconvenient, the court can resort to the sources of the
common law and "discover" an existing, but previously unrevealed,
rule to match the occasion.
After the rise of legislation, classical common law theory reached
maturity. All law is given to the courts by the people, either formally,
as in legislation, or informally, as in the common law. Furthermore,
the common law remains intact until it is altered by legislation. Once
legislation conflicts with the common law, the courts are obliged to
apply the statute as the law of the case. If the legislation is ambigu-
ous, then the court is bound to interpret the statute in accordance with
the legislative will. But in the absence of governing statutes, the com-
mon law prevails. Judges thus do not make law. With the use of logic
and reason they find the law and apply it to the facts of the case. The
judge is law finder and law applier, never law giver.
This process, Sir William would tell us, produced the common law
of crimes, of contracts, property, torts, and the other common law sub-
jects. It has been an essential part of American legal culture since the
common law was brought to this country.
21. Id. at *69-70.
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HI. The Modern Rebellion
It is doubtful that many lawyers or judges in this century have
fully embraced all aspects of the classical theory as articulated by
Blackstone. Some portions of the theory lived longer than others.
The most conservative version of the traditional view of the legal pro-
cess is what we now pejoratively call "mechanical jurisprudence."
Under this view, the facts of the case, not the law, are the primary
focus of attention. This view apparently survived into this century pri-
marily as a metaphor for the proper role of the judiciary in a democ-
racy.22 Even today, it may accurately describe how some judges and
some lawyers conceive of their daily work, especially in the lower
courts and in some areas of practice. On the other hand, the fact that
classical theory may accurately describe what is done in some settled
areas of practice does not mean that it accurately depicts either the
power of judges and lawyers in these situations, or the proper alloca-
tion of power in a contemporary democracy. At best, the classical
theory expresses what is done, not what the judges properly may do.
At worst, it is simply incorrect on all counts.
Additionally, it is doubtful that many judges or lawyers in this
century actually believe that a case is overruled because it mistakenly
interpreted the common law that is "out there." Rather, it is more
likely they believe it was overruled because it no longer articulates
acceptable policy.
Nevertheless, in some measure, classical theory has been the most
influential conception of the judicial process in the common law
world. It provides the core ideas against which modern conceptions of
the legal process rebel. We now turn to the modem rebellion against
classical theory, for these are the views that immediately influenced
Roger Traynor's thinking about the judicial process.
A. Holmes
Near the end of the century, Oliver Wendell Holmes analyzed the
common law in a series of lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute in
Boston. In his first lecture, Holmes stated that his goal for these lec-
tures was
to present a general view of the Common Law. To accomplish the
task, other tools are needed besides logic. It is something to show
that the consistency of a system requires a particular result, but it is
22. The phrase "mechanical jurisprudence" was given currency by Dean Pound's fa-
mous article of the same title. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L.
REv. 605 (1908).
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not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and polit-
ical theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the
rules by which men should be governed.23
The foregoing... well illustrates the paradox of form and substance
in the development of law. In form its growth is logical. The official
theory is that each new decision follows syllogistically from existing
precedents.... On the other hand, in substance the growth of the
law is legislative. And this in a deeper sense than that what the
courts declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It is legis-
lative in its grounds. The very considerations which judges most
rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret root from
which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course, consid-
erations of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every
important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at
bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of
public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our practice and tra-
ditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inartic-
ulate convictions, but not the less traceable to views of public policy
in the last analysis.24
Seventeen years later, Holmes was asked to deliver an address at
the dedication of a new building at the Boston University School of
Law. His address, The Path of the Law, 25 further developed the
themes discussed in the Lowell Lectures. It was in this address that he
gave us his famous, though controversial, definition of law: "The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more preten-
tious, are what I mean by the law."'26 Thinking it desirable "to point
out and dispel a confusion between morality and law, which some-
times rises to the height of conscious theory, ' 27 Holmes offered the
following explanation:
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a
good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force,
and therefore you can see the practical importance of the distinction
between morality and law. A man who cares nothing for an ethical
rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely never-
theless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and
23. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Holmes was asked
to deliver a course of lectures at the Lowell Institute in Boston in 1880. He gave eleven
lectures. They were subsequently published as The Common Law. The quotation is from
the first lecture.
24. Id. at 35-36.
25. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
26. Id. at 461.
27. Id. at 459.
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will want to keep out of jail if he can.2 8
Holmes drew this distinction to enable one to learn and understand
the law:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as
a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who
finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it,
in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. 29
Holmes then returned to the "fallacy" that "the only force at work in
the development of the law is logic."' 30
The danger of which I speak is not the admission that the principles
governing other phenomena also govern the law, but the notion that
a given system, ours, for instance, can be worked out like mathe-
matics from some general axioms of conduct .... 31
This mode of thinking is entirely natural. The training of lawyers is
a training in logic. The processes of analogy, discrimination, and
deduction are those in which they are most at home. The language
of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical
method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose
which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion,
and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies ajudgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing leg-
islative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it
is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.
You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a
condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of
some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or
because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some
attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative
measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical
conclusions.32
Near the end of his address, Holmes advised us on how to understand
and mold the path of the law:
[F]ollow the existing body of dogma into its highest generalizations
by the help of jurisprudence;33 next .... discover from history how it
has come to be what it is;34 and, finally, so far as you can, . . . con-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 465.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 465-66.
33. Id. at 476. To Holmes, jurisprudence
is simply law in its most generalized part. Every effort to reduce a case to a rule is
an effort of jurisprudence, although the name as used in English is confined to the
broadest rules and most fundamental conceptions. One mark of a great lawyer is
that he sees the application of the broadest rules.
Ie. at 474.
34. Id. Elsewhere Holmes states:
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sider the ends which the several rules seek to accomplish, the rea-
sons why those ends are desired, what is given up to gain them, and
whether they are worth the price.35
The fledgling social sciences, he noted, should be ever helpful in strik-
ing the utilitarian balance. 36
Holmes' break with classical common law theory could not have
been more profound. Judges make the common law, they do not find
it. They fashion it from policy, much as legislatures do, and then use it
to decide the case at hand. History, experience, contemporary cul-
ture-with all of its prejudices, values and moral and political theo-
ries-and expedience, together with precedent and logic, provide the
pattern, the needle, and the thread by which policy is sewn into new
law. The common law, in Holmes's conception, is thus not an existing
body of doctrine that is syllogistically applied to reach the court's
judgment. The common law is the judicial process and the prophecies
of what that process will produce. In essence, although precedent and
logic are the form in which it is cast, the common law is rooted in the
same sources that produce legislation. And though legislation and the
common law share these sources, they are unlike-for the common
law is process and prediction, whereas statutory law is existing, codi-
fied doctrine.
B. The Traditional School, Dean Ames and the Harvard Law School
We now know that the Lowell Institute lectures (The Common
Law) and the Boston University address (The Path of the Law) pro-
foundly affected American jurisprudence. What Holmes had to say,
of course, was not universally accepted. This was especially true of
the Boston University address. To many, including Dean Ames of the
Harvard Law School, Holmes seemed to ignore morals or morality as
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. History
must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope
of rules which it is our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, because
it is the first step toward an enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a deliberate
reconsideration of the worth of those rules.
Id. at 469.
35. Id. at 476. The last phrase refers to a prior discussion of the use of the social
sciences to determine the price paid for the policy adopted:
For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the
present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of eco-
nomics. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV.
Id. at 469.
36. Id. at 470-71.
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a source of the law.37 In 1908, using the invitation to give an address
at the 75th anniversary of the Cincinnati Law School, and intending
"to answer Holmes or at least to correct his position, '38 Dean Ames
delivered a speech on the role of morality in the growth of the law.
The address was subsequently published as the article, Law and
Morals.39 The lecture focused on the critical importance of the moral
sense of the community as a source of judge made law. The supposed
dispute on the role of morality in law between Justice Holmes and
Dean Ames, who was one of the most prominent figures in legal edu-
cation at the turn of the century, symbolizes much of what was to fol-
low in the first half of the twentieth century with theories of the
judicial process.
Before we turn to those developments, we should note that the
characterization of Dean Ames' address as a response to Holmes' The
Path of the Law seems contrived. Unless Holmes changed his think-
ing after he delivered the Lowell Institute lectures (The Common
Law), he still believed that "the prevalent moral and political theo-
ries" were used as sources of the law at the time he delivered the
Boston University speech.40 Holmes distinguished between law and
morality for one purpose: to make clear that morality is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient ingredient in the concept of law.41 If we
focus on the judicial process, then according to Holmes, law is what
37. Throughout The Path of the Law, Holmes distinguished between law and moral-
ity. He wrote:
I think it desirable, at once to point out and dispel a confusion between morality
and law, which sometimes rises to the height of conscious theory .... When I
emphasize the difference between law and morals I do so with reference to a
single end, that of learning and understanding the law ... I do not say that there
is not a wider point of view from which the distinction between law and morals
becomes of secondary or no importance... [b]ut I do say that distinction is of the
first importance for the object which we are here to consider-a right study and
mastery of the law as a business with well understood limits ....
Id. at 459. This was, of course, the point of his "bad man" theory. At a later point in his
essay, Holmes wrote:
I hope that my illustrations have shown the danger, both to speculation and to
practice, of confounding morality with law, and the trap which legal language lays
for us on that side of our way. For my own part, I often doubt whether it would
not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law
altogether, and other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored
by anything outside the law.
Id. at 464.
38. COMM. ON PosT-ADMISSION LEGAL EDUC., Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
N.Y., JURISPRUDENCE IN ACrION 4 (1953).
39. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97 (1908).
40. See supra text accompanying note 23.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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the courts say it is and what one can predict the courts will continue to
say is law in the future. 42 Whatever aids in that prediction, including
morality, is a source of the law. This hardly makes Holmes an amoral
theorist, unless one believes that morality is an indispensable source
of all law. Of course, some believed that was true. To them, Holmes
was simply wrong. But more important to our inquiry, the Holmesian
view of law thoroughly contradicts the traditional law-finding concep-
tion of the judicial process. But Holmes did not develop these ideas.
That task was left to others.
The early twentieth century was one of the most dynamic periods
in American legal history.43 The bar was professionalized, profes-
sional bar associations emerged, formal legal education became the
norm for lawyers, and citizen pressure groups began to take interest in
the law and legal institutions." Two additional developments would
help redefine the nature of the judicial process. "What particularly
marked the legal history of early twentieth-century United States,"
writes a legal historian about this period, "was a seemingly ubiquitous
concern for finding, fashioning, and using new sources of informa-
tion."'45 Whatever we may think of this "penchant for information" as
a paradigm for the early twentieth century American legal experi-
ence, 46 it is demonstrably true that the quality and quantity of legal
information was a primary concern throughout this era.47 This con-
cern permeated the entire profession. The traditionalists, including
Dean Ames and his colleagues at the Harvard Law School, solidified
the casebook method of law study begun by Christopher Columbus
Langdell at Harvard in 1870,48 wrote many of the multivolume trea-
tises of the early twentieth century, and produced the bulk of the
American Law Institute's Restatements of the law. Not to be outdone
by their professors, the Harvard students founded the Harvard Law
Review in 1887.49 Like Langdell's casebook method, the law review
42. See supra text accompanying note 25.
43. JOHN W. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE 3 (1981). I have relied on Pro-
fessor Johnson's book for guidance through the next few paragraphs of this article.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 29-69.
48. Robert Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in LAW IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 405,435-41 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971) (discussing
the casebook method and its spread throughout legal education).
49. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF
EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 440-41 (1908) (describing formation of the Re-
view as a "potent factor in increasing the prosperity of the [Harvard Law] School").
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spread throughout American legal education in the early part of this
century.
But the interest in information was not limited to creating new
expository treatises and Restatements of the law. A few academics
started taking Holmes seriously. They began looking beyond the
traditional methods of legal analysis for new sources of information-
to the world beyond the library. They sought to understand the pur-
pose of this quest for new, nontraditional, legal information.
A revolt against abstract legal theory was evolving, and the new
information was critical to the new theory.50 We now have the second
theme for the first three or four decades of this century: this was also
the era of revolt against abstract legal doctrine.
C. Dean Pound and Sociological Jurisprudence
Roscoe Pound was the great legal synthesizer of his day. Sam-
pling the currents of contemporary thought, Dean Pound took four of
the principal philosophical theories circulating at that time (the
Holmesian view of law, the pragmatism of William James and John
Dewey,51 Rudolf von Jhering's theory that law changes and develops
as a result of competing social interests,52 and the European free-law
movement 53) and welded them into a new, relatively complete theory
of American law. It was called "sociological jurisprudence. ' '54 Unfor-
50. Thurman Arnold, a Yale law professor, was one of the most vocal critics of the
restatement enterprise carried out for the most part at Harvard, and of the case method of
study, which dominated Harvard at that time. Professor Arnold referred to Harvard Law
School during this time as the "high church of abstract legal theology." T. ARNOLD, FAIR
FIGHrS AND FOUL 58 (1951). Professor Arnold was one of the founding partners of Ar-
nold, Fortas & Porter in Washington, D.C.
51. See generally ROEERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL
THEORY (1982) (defining pragmatism's core as follows: "something is true if it proves to
be useful in the appropriate human activity in the long run").
52. See generally RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husick
trans., 1913) (discussing law as a force created by society, not the individual). Holmes'
"bad man" analysis was suggested by von Jhering in this book, the second volume of which
was published in Germany in 1883. Pound, who read German from the age of six, un-
doubtedly read von Jhering in German. See PAUL SAYRE, THE LIFE OF RoscoE POUND 35
(1948) (quoting 1922 letter by Pound's mother in which she claimed to be teaching German
to her son); D. WIGDOR, RoscoE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW (1974).
53. This movement, also called sociological jurisprudence, developed a theory of law
that is strikingly similar to Roscoe Pound's sociological jurisprudence. See, e.g., JAMES E.
HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970, at 163 (1990) ("[T]he free-law move-
ment established a jurisprudential position that is almost equivalent to . . . the Poundian
paradigm .... ).
54. This title apparently was derived from Pound's article that used this phrase. See
Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAY 607 (1907) (call-
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tunately, Pound's theory was spread throughout a number of arti-
cles. 55 The following general description, taken from Professor
Herget's history of the jurisprudence of this era, extracts the essence
of Pound's sociological jurisprudence:
[The] [s]tudy of .. .law should move away from the analysis of
appellate court opinions and toward the effectiveness of trial-court
operations. The emphasis should be on the process of law in its
social context; the study of abstract doctrine should be deem-
phasized. The main province of the ... inquiry should be the actual
effects-the factual consequence-of legal doctrine, court decisions,
and legislation .... Courts and scholars alike should recognize that
certainty in law is illusory and that legal precepts should be taken as
flexible guides to decision-making so that justice can be achieved in
individual cases. Purposes of the law, not sanctions, should be em-
phasized. [In addition] ... law must be treated instrumentally; it is
always a means to an end. The pragmatic philosophy must be
adapted to the legal enterprise. 56
[Finally],.. . the processes of both adjudication and legislation are
viewed as an activity of government officials in which various claims
are made by groups or individuals upon the decision-making body.
To have a chance of being accepted, these claims must be more than
mere personal demands; they are asserted to be morally right, ac-
cepted by society, and generally applicable to some particular class
or group of persons. 57
D. Cardozo and The Nature Of The Judicial Process
Pound's theory of "sociological jurisprudence" was influential be-
yond academic circles. In the Storrs Lectures at Yale University in
1921, Benjamin N. Cardozo, then a judge on the New York Court of
Appeals, gave the first sophisticated public discussion of the process
of judicial law making.58 These lectures, entitled The Nature of the
ing for incorporation of the political, economic, and sociological learning of the day into
the teaching of law). One of the first articles written by Pound to employ this new theory is
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909) (arguing that failure of courts to face inequal-
ity inherent in relations between industrial employer and employee ignores common
knowledge of mankind and threatens integrity of courts). For a recent discussion of
Pound's "Sociological Jurisprudence" see HERGET, supra note 53, at 147-93 (described as a
"response to the shortcomings of the older philosophies").
55. Pound never produced a book elaborating his theory of sociological jurispru-
dence. His theory must be gleaned from a variety of his writings. For that reason, and since
Professor Herget has recently extracted the essence of Pound's theory of "sociological ju-
risprudence" from Pound's voluminous writings, I will use Professor Herget's synopsis. See
HERGET, supra note 53, at 164-70.
56. Id. at 165-66.
57. Id. at 168.
58. Cardozo was a judge of the New York Court of Appeals when he gave the 1921
Storrs Lectures. The lectures were "of such vital import and such charm of expression that
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Judicial Process,59 drew upon existing theories of the judicial process
to explain how judges make law. Focusing on the role of precedent,
Cardozo describes the typical approach to the judicial task:
The first thing [a judge]_ does is to compare the case before him with
the precedents .... [I]n a system so highly developed as our own,
precedents have so covered the ground that they fix the point of
departure from which the labor of the judge begins. Almost invari-
ably, his first step is to examine and compare them. If they are plain
and to the point, there may be need of nothing more. Stare decisis is
at least the everyday working rule of our law. I shall have some-
thing to say later about the propriety of relaxing the rule in excep-
tional conditions. But unless those conditions are present, the work
of deciding cases in accordance with precedents that plainly fit them
is a process similar in its nature to that of deciding cases in accord-
ance with a statute.... It is when ... there is no decisive precedent,
that the serious business of the judge begins. He must then fashion
law for the litigants before him. In fashioning it for them, he will be
fashioning it for others.60
For the typical cases, Cardozo provided this traditional method:
employing logic (what he called "the method of philosophy" 61), he
applied the obviously relevant rules of law to the facts of the case to
reach his decision.62 There are, however, situations in which the tradi-
it hastened his progress from the New York Court of Appeals to the United States
Supreme Court." Arthur L. Corbin, Foreword to B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW
vii (12th prtg. 1963) (1924).
59. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
60. Id. at 19-21. In his subsequent Yale lectures, Cardozo stated:
The problem stood before me in a new light when I had to cope with it as judge. I
found that the creative element was greater than I had fancied; the forks in the
road more frequent; the signposts less complete.... Some cases, of course, there
are where one route and only one is possible. They are the cases where the law is
fixed and settled. They make up in bulk what they lack in interest. Other cases
present a genuine opportunity for choice ....
CARDOZO, supra note 58, at 57-58.
61. "The directive force of a principle," wrote Cardozo, "may be exerted along the
line of logical progression; this I will call the rule of analogy or the method of philoso-
phy ...." CARDozO, supra note 59, at 30.
62. The obviously relevant rules of law may be based upon a constitution, a statute, or
precedent:
There are times when the source is obvious. The rule that fits the case may be
supplied by the constitution or by statute. If that is so, the judge looks no farther.
The correspondence ascertained, his duty is to obey. The constitution overrides a
statute, but a statute, if consistent with the constitution, overrides the law of
judges. In this sense, judge-made law is secondary and subordinate to the law
that is made by legislators.
Id at 14.
Cardozo recognized the creative element involved when a judge interprets a constitu-
tion or a statute, and when a judge fills in the "'gaps which are found in every positive law
in greater or less measure."' Id at 15-16 (quoting BRrrr, Dm KUNST DER RECHT-
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tional logical method is not up to the task at hand.63 When this is so,
as when there is no seemingly relevant precedent, the judge faces a
creative task.64 Here,
the problem which confronts the judge is in reality a twofold one:
he must first extract from the precedents the underlying principle,
the ratio decidendi; he must then determine the path or direction
along which the principle is to move and develop, if it is not to
wither and die.
The first branch of the problem is the one which we are accus-
tomed to address ourselves more consciously than to the other.
Cases do not unfold their principles for the asking .... Let us as-
sume, however, that this task has been achieved .... The problem
remains to fix the bounds and the tendencies of development and
growth, to set the directive force in motion along the right path at
the parting of the ways. 65
For this second step, Cardozo identified four lanterns the judge
might use to illuminate the way: (1) The method of philosophy;66
(2) the historical method (which lays bare the roots and soil from
which precedent emerges);67 (3) the customs of the community;68 and
SANWENDUNG [THE ART OF THE APPLICATION OF LAW] 72). This is done, according to
Cardozo, "by the same processes and methods that have built up the customary law." Id.
at 17.
I will dwell no further for the moment upon the significance of constitution and
statute as sources of the law. The work of a judge in interpreting and developing
them has indeed its problems and its difficulties, but they are problems and diffi-
culties not different in kind or measure from those besetting him in other fields.
Id. at 18.
63. "The common law," wrote Cardozo, "does not work from pre-established truths
of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them deductively. Its
method is inductive, and it draws its generalizations from particulars." Id. at 22-23. He
also thought that
Nine-tenths, perhaps more of the cases that come before a court are predeter-
mined-predetermined in the sense that they are predestined-their fate preest-
ablished by inevitable laws that follow them from birth to death.
Id. at 60.
64. Id. at 23.
65. Id. at 28-30.
66. Id. at 30. "The directive force of a principle may be exerted along the line of
logical progression; this I will call the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy." Id.
Logic thus plays a major role in Cardozo's theory of the judicial process.
67. "The directive force of principle may be exerted ... along the line of historical
development; this I will call the method of evolution ... " Id. at 30-31. Cardozo believed
that the method of history could both complement and confine the method of philosophy.
It could complement because "often, the effect of history is to make the path of logic
clear." Id. at 51. It could confine because the "tendency of a principle to expand itself to
the limit of its logic may be counteracted by the tendency to confine itself within the limits
of its history." Id. Reminiscent of Holmes' use of history in the Path of the Law, Cardozo
thought the principal value of this method is that "history, in illuminating the past, illumi-
nates the present, and in illuminating the present, illuminates the future." Id. at 53. He
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(4) the "method of sociology. '69
Cardozo believed the method of philosophy-the use of logic and
analogy-was the wellspring of judge-made law. In this crucial second
step, fixing the bounds and tendencies of development and growth,
the method of philosophy "has the primacy that comes from natural
and orderly and logical succession. '70 It is a by-product, Cardozo
seems to say, of the rule of precedent:
Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the ex-
ception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administra-
tion of justice in the courts. A sentiment like in kind, though
different in degree, is at the root of the tendency of precedent to
extend itself along the lines of logical development.71
In the absence of a better recipe, the method of philosophy molds the
judgment. The methods of history, custom, and sociology provide ri-
val paths, but theirs is the burden of overcoming the method of philos-
ophy-the burden of enticing the judge to explore their way. How
history72 and custom73 emit their siren's call and alter the destination
used the law of property as his primary example of when the historical method was needed,
for with property "there can be no progress without history." Id. at 54. Cardozo also
mentions the importance of the method of history to understanding the distinction be-
tween larceny and embezzlement. Id. at 56.
68. Which Cardozo also called "the method of tradition." Id. at 31. Recognizing the
variety of meanings given to "custom," Cardozo thought that in "these days, at all events,
we look to custom, not so much for the creation of new rules, but for the tests and stan-
dards that are to determine how established rules shall be applied. When custom seeks to
do more than this, there is a growing tendency in the law to leave development to legisla-
tion." IAt at 60. "General standards of right and duty are established. Custom must deter-
mine whether there has been adherence or departure." Ma at 62. Nevertheless, "the
power is not lost because it is exercised with caution." Id at 61. Cardozo used the "law
merchant" as his primary example of the use of custom in the judicial process. Id. at 61-64.
69. Cardozo identified the method of sociology with "justice, morals and social wel-
fare, the mores of the day... ." Id at 31. He distinguished "custom" from the method of
sociology by noting that a "slight extension of custom identifies it with customary morality,
the prevailing standard of right conduct, the mores of the time. This is the point of contact
between the method of tradition and the method of sociology. They have their roots in the
same soil." Id at 63-64.
70. Id. at 31.
71. Id. at 34. See also id at 48-49, 66-67.
72. Cardozo refers to the "historical method, or the method of evolution" as a source
of judge-made law. See id. at 51. By "history" he means the events that made legal doc-
trine "what it is." It at 52.
The directive force of... precedent may be found either in the events that made
it what it is, or in some principle which enables us to say of it that it is what it
ought to be. Developments may involve either an investigation of origins or an
effort of pure reason.... Some conceptions of law owe their existing form almost
exclusively to history. They are not to be understood except as historical growths.
In the development of such principles, history is likely to predominate over logic
or pure reason. Other conceptions, though they have, of course, a history, have
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of the case should be familiar enough to allow us to focus on their
more elusive kin, the method of sociology.
As sources of judge-made law, the methods of history and custom
primarily focus on things past as they presently appear. The method
of sociology chiefly looks to the present and to the future. The future,
as it is predicted to be, becomes a source of judge-made law. The
methods of history and custom emphasize the rule applied. The
method of sociology looks to the law's goals and assesses how they
are-or how in the future they might be-achieved. Law is an instru-
mentality of public policy.74 The viability of past judge-made law
taken form and shape to a larger extent under the influence of reason or of com-
parative jurisprudence.... In the development of such principles logic is likely to
predominate over history .... Sometimes the subject matter will lend itself as
naturally to one method as to another [referring to the methods of history and of
philosophy]. In such circumstances, considerations of custom or utility will often
be present to regulate the choice. A residuum will be left where the personality
of the judge, his taste, his training or his bent of mind, may prove the controlling
factor. I do not mean that the directive force of history, even where its claims are
most assertive, confines the law of the future to uninspired repetition of the law
of the present and the past. I mean simply that the history, in illuminating the
past, illuminates the present, and in illuminating the present, illuminates the
future.
Id. at 52-53.
73. "If history and philosophy do not serve to fix the direction of a principle," Car-
dozo tells us, "custom may step in." Id. at 58. Although he acknowledged that "custom" is
sometimes equated with the common law, as when we use the phrase "customary law,"
Cardozo is here concerned with a practice which is followed by people of a particular
group or region as a source of the common law. Id. at 58-59.
Undoubtedly the creative energy of custom in the development of common law is
less today than in was in bygone times. Even in bygone times, its energy was very
likely exaggerated by Blackstone and his followers. . . . In these days, at all
events, we look to custom, not so much for the creation of new rules, but for the
tests and standards that are to determine how established rules shall be applied.
When custom seeks to do more than this, there is a growing tendency in the law
to leave development to legislation. Judges do not feel the same need of putting
the imprimatur of law upon customs of recent growth, knocking for entrance into
the legal system, and viewed askance because of some novel aspect of form or
feature, as they would if legislatures were not in frequent session, capable of es-
tablishing a title that will be unimpeached and unimpeachable. But the power is
not lost because it is exercised with caution.
Id. at 59-61.
74. Cardozo uses the term "public policy" broadly. It encompasses the "good of the
collective body." Id. at 72.
[I]ts demands are often those of mere expediency or prudence. It may mean on
the other hand the social gain that is wrought by adherence to the standards of
right conduct, which find expression in the mores of the community. In such
cases, its demands are those of religion or of ethics or of the social sense of jus-
tice, whether formulated in creed or system, or immanent in the common mind.
One does not readily find a single term to cover these and kindred aims which
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(precedent) thus is appraised by how its continued use furthers the
public good. A new law proposed by the judge's creative powers is
evaluated by its predicted capacity "to attain the ends for which [it is]
devised."75 These assessments, which are pragmatic judgments, pro-
vide the fountainheads of judge-made law in the method of sociol-
ogy.76 In making these assessments, judges are not "free to substitute
their own ideas of reason and justice for those of the men and women
whom they serve. Their standard must be an objective one. '77 The
method of sociology is not limited to re-evaluating precedent and to
creating new judge-made law to achieve some public goal.
The method of sociology (except, perhaps, for the method of phi-
losophy) is "the arbiter between other methods, determining in the
last analysis the choice of each, weighing their competing claims, set-
ting bounds to their pretensions, balancing and moderating and har-
monizing them all."78
Of all the interests the method of sociology brings to its calculus,
one of the "most fundamental," according to Cardozo, "is that the law
shall be uniform and impartial .... Therefore in the main," he contin-
ued, "there shall be adherence to precedent. ' 79 Thus, despite the
grand role he depicts for the method of sociology (re-evaluating pre-
cedent, creating new law, and mediating among the other methods),
his final message is inherently conservative: precedent prevails, ex-
shade off into one another by imperceptible gradations."
Id. Later Cardozo notes that the method of sociology frequently supplements the other
methods. For example:
In some, however, the method of sociology works in harmony with the method of
philosophy or of evolution or of tradition. Those, therefore, are the fields where
logic and coherence and consistency must still be sought as ends. In others, it
seems to displace the methods that compete with it.... In a sense it is true that
we are applying the method of sociology when we pursue logic and coherence and
consistency as the greater social values.
Id. at 75.
75. 1d. at 73 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Administrative Application of Legal Standards,
A.B.A. PRoc. 441, 451 (1919)).
76. IL at 102-03.
77. Id. at 88-89. Cardozo continues, "In such matters, the thing that counts is not
what I believe to be right. It is what I may reasonably believe that some other man of
normal intellect and conscience might reasonably look upon as right." ld. at 89. Later he
writes, "[A] judge, I think, would err if he were to impose upon the community as a rule of
life his own idiosyncrasies of conduct or belief.... [HI]e would be under a duty to conform
to the accepted standards of the community, the mores of the time." IL at 108.
78. Id. at 98.
79. Id. at 112.
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cept in unusual circumstances; 80 the power of innovation of any judge
is insignificant "when compared with the bulk and pressure of the
rules that hedge him in on every side."' 81 Disagreeing with Holmes,
Cardozo asserts that law is not simply the prediction of what a court
will do, for the idea of law is not necessarily concerned with judicial
behavior.82 Judges should overrule precedent and thus replace old
doctrine with new law when the method of sociology counsels it, but
that will be the rare occasion. Judges do not find the law, of course,
they make it;83 but their creative power largely is confined to filling
the gaps left by precedent and statutory law. 84
Of the cases that come before the court in which I sit, a majority, I
think, could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any way
but one. The law and its application alike are plain. Such cases are
predestined, so to speak, to affirmance without opinion. In another
and considerable percentage, the rule of law is certain, and the ap-
plication alone is doubtful .... Often these cases and others like
them provoke difference of opinion among judges. Jurisprudence
remains untouched, however, regardless of the outcome. Finally
there remains a percentage, not large indeed, and yet not so small as
to be negligible, where a decision one way or the other, will count
for the future, will advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes
little, the development of the law. These are the cases where the
creative element in the judicial process finds its opportunity and
power.85
Because of the felicity of their expression, because they were the
first comprehensive statement of the judicial process by a sitting
judge, and because they took account of most of the contemporary
theories, Cardozo's lectures remain to this day one of the few works
that must be read to understand the judicial process as it emerged in
the first half of this century. Yet many found flaws in much of what he
said.86 Our principal concern here is with his central themes: the re-
80. Id. at 112, 149. The primacy of precedent is also supported by practical considera-
tions: "[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past
decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks
on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him." Id. at
149.
81. Id. at 136-37.
82. Id. at 124-30.
83. Id. at 133-35, 150 (recognizing that a judge has a duty to make law in the appropri-
ate circumstances).
84. Id. at 124-25, 131.
85. Id. at 164-65.
86. Judge Posner writes, for example:
Although the legal establishment canonized Cardozo during his lifetime and he is
still widely considered not merely one of the greatest judges of all time but a
judicial saint, there is a considerable, perhaps an increasing, undercurrent of dubi-
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straining forces of precedent; and that the methods of philosophy, his-
tory and custom, with their essentially backward focus, should
produce change slowly. On the infrequent occasion when new law
must be made, or when change becomes necessary, Cardozo believed
the method of sociology is the judge's main guide. Thus, despite Car-
dozo's enthusiastic embrace, the method of sociology would be infre-
quently employed. The law remained bound to abstract legal theory,
to the law as it is written, and to the idea that legal doctrine largely is
settled and certain.
E. Legal Realism
The chief academic criticism of Cardozo's approach to the legal
process (though seldom explicitly directed at his work) focused on
Cardozo's exception. Looking to Holmes87 and Pound,88 rather than
to Cardozo, the scholars known as the Realists adopted the sociologi-
ety. Today many legal thinkers believe that Cardozo has been greatly over-
rated-that his liberalism is fake, his judicial philosophy a bunch of platitudes, his
famous writing style obese and archaic. More are unsure how he should be
ranked, and indeed whether any judge can be evaluated on an objective scale of
merit.
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION vii-viii (1990).
87. E.g.,, JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 253-60 (1930); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THm BRAMBLE BUSH: SoME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY ix (1930)
(citing Holmes as having delivered one of the first wholesale presentations of the realistic
viewpoint); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1226-27 n.18 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realism]. The intellectual historian Morton White tells us that Holmes was the father of
legal realism. MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST
FoRMALisM 15-18, 59-75 (1949). Although the later realists claimed Holmes as their intel-
lectual father, Professor Johnson reminds us that some of Holmes' writings "were decid-
edly antirealist." JOHNSON, supra note 43, at 125-26.
88. E.g.,, Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REv. 431, 435 n.3 (1930) (crediting Pound with early formulations of many precepts later
becoming central to realism). "If Holmes was a questionable parent for realism," Profes-
sor Johnson wrote, "Roscoe Pound ... was a more likely source of the movement's pater-
nity." JOHNSON, supra note 43, at 126. On the other hand, Professor Herget regards Legal
Realism as an extension of what he calls the "Poundian Paradigm." HERGET, supra note
53, at 170. A recent study points out that Pound's writings were so varied, and in some
cases contradictory, that the "sense in which Pound was a forerunner of the Realists is thus
complex: His early essays they found inspirational; his later work was one of their princi-
pal targets." AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 7 (William W. Fisher et al. eds., 1993) [hereinaf-
ter AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM]. See generally ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM
AND AMICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982) (acknowledging Pound among the foremost
American "pragmatic instrumentalists," Summers' term for Legal Realists); G. Edward
White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in
Early 7Wentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999, 1004-05 (1972) (discussing how
Pound's principles of jurisprudence, once embraced by early Realists, were later attacked).
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cal method as their general approach to the legal process. 89 The Real-
ist "Movement," which we are told was no movement at all,90
minimized the importance of abstract legal theory and rejected the
notion that judges actually are bound by "paper rules." Professor
Karl Llewellyn's inventory of the commonly held beliefs of the realist
scholars provides an excellent summary of their thinking. The Real-
ists' creed, according to Professor Llewellyn, was:91
1. The conception of law in flux, of moving law, and of judicial crea-
tion of law.92
2. The conception of law as a means to social ends and not as an
end in itself; so that any part needs constantly to be examined for its
purpose, and for its effect, and to be judged in the light of both and
of their relation to each other.93
3. The conception of society in flux, and in flux typically faster than
the law, so that the probability is always given that any portion of
law needs reexamination to determine how far it fits the society it
purports to serve.94
4. The temporary divorce of Is and Ought for purposes of study....
[N]o judgment of what Ought to be done in the future with respect
to any part of law can be intelligently made without knowing objec-
tively, as far as possible, what that part of law is now doing .... On
the Ought side this means an insistence on informed evaluations
instead of armchair speculations. 95
5. Distrust of traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as they
purport to describe what either courts or people are actually doing.
Hence the constant emphasis on rules as "generalized predictions of
what courts will do."96
6. [D]istrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-formula-
tions are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions.
This involves the tentative adoption of the theory of rationaliza-
tion 97 for the study of opinions.98
89. The list of academics mentioned by Professor Karl Llewellyn (with the assistance
of Jerome Frank) in his article Some Realism About Realism is typically used to identify the
legal realists. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 87, at 1226 n.18, 1233
n.34. The legal realist writing is listed in Appendix I of that article. Id. at 1257-59.
90. Id. at 1233-1234 (focusing on wide differences of opinion among the members of
the "movement").
91. Rather than paraphrase these ideas, I prefer to use Professor Llewellyn's words
for the major themes.
92. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 87, at 1236.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1236-37.
96. Id. at 1237.
97. Llewellyn explains the theory of rationalization of opinions as follows:
An early and fruitful line of attack borrowed from psychology the concept of
rationalization already mentioned. To recanvass the opinions, viewing them no
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7. The belief in the worthwhileness of grouping cases and legal situ-
ations into narrower categories than has been the practice in the
past. This is connected with the distrust of verbally simple rules-
which so often cover dissimilar and non-simple fact situations .... 99
8. An insistence on evaluation of any part of law in terms of its
effects, and an insistence on the worthwhileness of trying to find
these effects. 100
9. Insistence on sustained and programmatic attack on the problems
of law along any of these lines.' 0 '
The major points of disagreement between Cardozo and the
iJ.ealists'concerned (1) the degree to which law is determinate or inde-
terminate, (2) the role of doctrine and precedent in the decision of
cases, (3) the role of logic and reason in the judicial process, and
(4) the nature of legal culture. Cardozo believed, for example, that
existing precedent governs the majority of cases, the method of philos-
ophy enables the judge to extract the appropriate rule from governing
precedent; because of the binding effect of the extracted doctrine, the
judgment in most cases is "predetermined."'10 2
On the other hand, the Realists believed that because of the wide
range of precedent available for use in most cases, and because most,
if not all, precedent holds within its skin a variety of rules, judges have
wide discretion in the decision of cases. A judge, for example, selects
the precedents that "govern" the case from an array of existing law;
then the judge extracts from the selected precedent the doctrine she
will use in deciding the case at hand. Reason and logic, though indis-
pensable as tools in the legal process, are neutral and can be used to
longer as mirroring the process of deciding cases, but rather as trained lawyers'
arguments made by the judges (after the decision has been reached), intended to
make the decision seem plausible, legally decent, legally right, to make it seem,
indeed, legally inevitable-this was to open up new vision. It was assumed that
the deductive logic of opinions need by no means be either a description of the
process of decision, or an explanation of how the decision was reached. Indeed
over-enthusiasm has at times assumed that the logic of the opinion could be
neither; and similar over-enthusiasm, perceiving case after case in which the opin-
ion is clearly almost valueless as an indication of how that case came to decision,
has worked at times almost as if the opinion were equally valueless in predicting
what a later court will do.
ld at 1238-39.
98. Id. at 1237.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1237-38.
102. "Of the cases that come before the court in which I sit, a majority, I think, could
not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one. The law and its application
alike are plain, Such cases are predestined, so to speak, to affirmance without opinion."
CARDozo, supra note 59, at 164.
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reach or rationalize any decision. Thus, the Realist would argue, no
legal decision is "predestined" unless the individual judge makes it so.
Of equal importance is the contrast between Cardozo and the
Realists with respect to the more general legal culture. Cardozo be-
lieved that the judicial process should move slowly. "[A]dherence to
precedent should be the rule and not the exception. '10 3 He also be-
lieved that the law as written, together with its paper goals and paper
effects, were accurate statements of what judges do and the effect
their judgments have on the real world. The Realists saw society in
constant flux and insisted that law, even judge-made law, should keep
apace of society's movement. Furthermore, at the core of realism is
the idea that the law-in-action functions quite differently from ab-
stract law or law-as-it-is-written and pondered. Written law is a state-
ment about how the law ought to function, whereas the law as it is
actually practiced is the real law.10 4 Empiricism was thus a crucial
part of the Realist credo. Real law is studied by empirical research.
As with all scientific research, the Realists recognized that empirical
research should not be predicated upon the values of the researcher.
[D]uring the [empirical] inquiry itself into what Is, the observation,
the description, and the establishment of relations between the
things described are to remain as largely as possible uncontaminated
by the desires of the observer or by what he wishes might be or
thinks ought (ethically) to be. More particularly, this involves dur-
ing the study of what courts are doing the effort to disregard the
question what they ought to do.10 5
103. Id. at 149.
104. This theme appears throughout much of the realist writing. For example, Profes-
sor Llewellyn wrote:
"Paper rules" are what have been treated, traditionally, as rules of law: the ac-
cepted doctrine of the time and place-what the books there say 'the law' is. The
"real rules" and rights-"what the courts will do in a given case, and nothing
more pretentious"-are then predictions. They are, I repeat, on the level of is-
ness and not of oughtness; they seek earnestly to go no whit, in their suggestion,
beyond the remedy actually available.
Llewellyn, supra note 88, at 448.
105. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 87, at 1236. The professor
continues:
Such divorce of Is and Ought is, of course, not conceived as permanent. To men
who begin with a suspicion that change is needed, a permanent divorce would be
impossible. The argument is simply that no judgment of what Ought to be done
in the future with respect to any part of law can be intelligently made without
knowing objectively, as far as possible, what that part of law is now doing. And
realists believe that experience shows the intrusion of Ought-spectacles during the
investigation of the facts to make it very difficult to see what is being done."
Id. at 1236-37.
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The Realists and Cardozo, however, were united in a number of
beliefs: the insistence that judges make law; the importance of prag-
matism in evaluating doctrine; and the reception of the method of so-
ciology. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the differences between
Cardozo's approach to the judicial process and the Realist conception
of that endeavor were profound.
The Realists were academics and Cardozo was a judge. Some of
the differences, perhaps, can be accounted for by this difference in
their roles. Academics are told to research, analyze and evaluate the
law and legal institutions; judges are told to decide cases as fairly and
efficiently as the system permits. When Realist academics, such as
Thurman Arnold, William Clark, William 0. Douglas, and Jerome
Frank, were appointed to the bench, they did not create an obvious
Realist jurisprudence in the opinions they wrote. Neither did they
write the Realist equivalent to Cardozo's The Nature of the Judicial
Process.
Perhaps with a tinge of cynicism, it has been noted that in confir-
mation hearings, most judicial candidates profess adherence to the
classical view of the legal process.10 6 Furthermore, "in private few
contemporary American judges would describe their jobs in precisely
the terms the Realists used."'01 7 Nevertheless, it must be conceded
that Legal Realism continues to influence American legal thought, in-
cluding judicial thought, to this day.108
Legal Realism's influence was produced by a relatively small
number of legal scholars. Not all academic lawyers were caught in
Realism's web. It is probably true that before World War II only a
small minority of academics worked and wrote in the realist mode.
Nevertheless, it is not easy to determine precisely which authors and
which works should be included in an accounting of the Realist Move-
ment. 0 9 Professor Llewellyn's list of Realists, generated in 1931, con-
tained only twenty names." 0 Most were faculty members at
Columbia, Yale, and the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law in Balti-
106. See Mark V. Thshnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretiv-
ism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. R-v. 781,781-82 (1983) (observing that nominees
promise to "apply the law rather than make it," and interpret the Constitution according to
the framers' intent).
107. AMECAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 88, at xv.
108. See id at xiv-xv (citing several modem schools influenced by Realist thought).
109. Id. at xiii.
110. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 87, at 1257-59 app. I.
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more.'11 There were exceptions, of course. Roscoe Pound became
Dean of the Harvard Law School in 1916, shortly after he issued his
famous call for sociological jurisprudence. He remained at Harvard
until he resigned in 1936.112 Dean Pound should be regarded as a Re-
alist, at least before he and a number of the acknowledged Realists
had their famous dispute over the value of legal rules and the place of
moral values in the law.1 3 Even those who would deny that Pound
was a Realist would concede that he is one of Legal Realism's for-
bearers. Except for Pound, Frankfurter, and perhaps a few others, the
Harvard law faculty remained in the traditional conceptualist-formal-
ist camp of legal thought."l 4 The Harvard faculty epitomized the
thinking of most American legal academics and judges in this period.
Another exception was Professor Max Radin at U.C. Berkeley's Boalt
Hall. As we shall see, Professor Radin both symbolizes the decline of
legal realism and brings us back to the purpose of our study, Roger
Traynor's theory of the judicial process.
F. The Death of the Legal Realism Movement and the Rise of Reasoned
Elaboration
With the decline in enthusiasm for empirical legal research, Real-
ism, which had remained a comparatively small movement, began to
ebb in the late 1930's. There were a number of reasons for turning
away from empiricism. Much of the social science methodology em-
ployed by the Realists was unsophisticated and thus yielded little of
value." 5 Further, Realism was associated almost entirely with the
111. AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE, supra note 43, at 93-110 (contrasting the progressive
curriculum at Columbia, Yale, and Hopkins with Harvard's traditional approach); L. KAL-
MAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 67-78 (1986) (same).
112. It is difficult to determine exactly where Dean Pound fits into this analysis. His
call for sociological jurisprudence and his empirical work establishes him as a parent of the
Realism Movement. See, e.g., HERGET, supra note 53, at 170 (asserting that Pound's early
work was his only significant contribution to jurisprudence). Yet there are major contra-
dictions in his later work. See KALMAN, supra note 111, at 45-46, 55-62 (detailing the dis-
sent between Pound and the Realists).
113. See Roscoe Pound, The Call For A Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REv. 697
(1931) (praising the virtues and observing the limitations of Realism); Llewellyn, Some
Realism About Realism, supra note 87. For different accounts of this dispute, compare
HERGET, supra note 53, at 176-80 (calling their dispute a "great non debate"), with JOHN-
SON, supra note 43, at 134-36 (discussing how Llewellyn and Frank considered their dispute
with Pound as a serious one).
114. KALMAN, supra note 111, at 45-66; G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERI-
CAN LEGAL THOUGHT 125 (1978).
115. See, e.g., Mortimer J. Adler, Legal Certainty, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 91 (1931) (criti-
cizing Jerome Frank's LAW AND THE MODERN MIND and Realist work in general as au-
thoritarian and dogmatic); AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 88, at 233; see also
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legal academy. Critics of Realism and traditional educators argued
that empirical research took too much time and energy away from the
practical training of lawyers." 6 It also promised to consume too many
of the sparse resources available to legal educators. Empirical re-
search was relatively expensive, and the parsimonious financial cli-
mate during the decade following the great stock market crash made
the funding of empirical research difficult." 7 As would be expected
from constant criticism, the lack of funding, and the all too frequent
marginal results of doubtful utility, many of the true believers became
disillusioned.118 Realism's death seemed imminent.
But long before the Realism Movement reached the end of its
natural life, it was killed by a series of deadly blows. Realism drew
vitriolic criticism from its earliest days. Its pragmatism, its questioning
of abstract ideology, and its insistence on value-neutral research made
it vulnerable to the charge that Realism was morally and ethically rel-
ativistic." 9 In addition, some Realists went beyond skepticism about
the role of moral and ethical values in the legal process. They argued
that absolute moral values had no place in the legal process. 20 By
1935, totalitarianism in much of the world put Realism on the defen-
sive.'2 1 "American intellectuals," Professor Johnson wrote, "recoiling
in outrage at the Stalinist purges, the atrocities of Franco and Musso-
lini, and the naked 'might-makes-right' philosophy of Nazi Germany,
Herman Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and Value Judgments, 10 TEx. L. REv. 127 (1932); JOHN
HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 224-38
(1995).
116. JOHNSON, supra note 43, at 154; see SCHLEGEL, supra note 115, at 212-13.
117. JOHNSON, supra note 43, at 154; SCHLEGEL, supra note 115, at 213.
118. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISES OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 139-
158 (1973) (chronicling the transition of Robert Maynard Hutchins from true believer to
vociferous critic of Legal Realism).
119. See, e.g., id. at 91-94, 159-72.
120. See, e.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937) (charac-
terizing democracy and capitalism as enterprises furthering business concerns); EDWARD S.
ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935) (asserting that lawyers should follow a "natu-
ralistic philosophy of law"); Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J.
303 (1927) (concepts of natural law should be abandoned in favor of relativistic legal prin-
ciples); Underhill Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 609
(1923) (social policy should be based on its intended consequences rather than underlying
principles); Walter Nelles, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 765,766-67
(1933) (book review of Felix S. Cohen's book of the same title) (denying ethical right and
ought without qualification). See generally WHITE, supra note 114, at 137.
121. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal
Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. HIST. REv. 424 (1969); PURCELL,
supra note 118, at 160-63.
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struck out at legal realism."' 22
Reminiscent of the supposed disagreement between Holmes and
Dean Ames over the role of morality in law and of the dispute that
created the rift between Dean Pound and the Realists, the focus of the
attack was on Realism's apparently relativistic approach to morals and
ethics. America, as a civilization, professes to be dedicated to liberty,
democracy, and freedom. These ideals are thought to be absolute
moral values that distinguish America from totalitarian regimes
throughout the world. In the words of Professor Edgar Bodenheimer,
Realism was, by denying the existence of any necessary relationship
between law and moral values, "prepar[ing] the intellectual ground
for a tendency toward totalitarianism in [America]."'1 23 Professor
Bodenheimer's views were shared by others, 124 including Professor
Lon Fuller of the Harvard Law School125 and Dean Pound.126 In a
less temperate vein, Professor Walter B. Kennedy of Fordham Univer-
sity Law School referred to Realism as a "goose-step philosophy."'1 27
In summing up this criticism of Realism's relativistic approach, Ed-
ward Purcell wrote,
[Realism's] apparent ethical relativism seemed to mean that no Nazi
barbarity could be justly branded as evil, while its identification of
law with the actions of government officials gave even the most of-
fensive Nazi edict the sanction of true law. Juxtaposing that logic to
the actions of the totalitarian states, the critics painted realism in
the most ominous and shocking colors.' 28
The goal of these critical intellectuals was to justify American de-
mocracy against totalitarian claims on the one hand and to refute the
perceived ethical relativism of Realism on the other hand. In the eyes
122. JOHNSON, supra note 43, at 155.
123. EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 316 (1940).
124. See, e.g., HERGET, supra note 53, at 190-93 (noting Professor Walter Kennedy,
inter alia); PURCELL, supra note 118, at 161-72; WHITE, supra note 114, at 140.
125. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); see also Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 659 (1957) (criti-
cizing Hart's theories as insufficiently condemnatory of Nazi ideology).
126. ROSCOE POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY (1940); Roscoe Pound, The
Future of Lay, 47 YALE L.J. 2 (1937).
127. Walter B. Kennedy, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS
OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 151-52 (1941). Professor Kennedy was one of the early
critics of Realism. See, e.g., Walter B. Kennedy, Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law, 9
MARO. L. REV. 63 (1925) (cautioning against the abandonment of natural rights advocated
by early Realists); Walter B. Kennedy, Principles or Facts?, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 53 (1935)
(rejecting behaviorist aspects of Realism as dehumanizing); Walter B. Kennedy, A Review
of Legal Realism, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 362 (1940) (postulating four fundamental defects in
Realist thinking).
128. PURCELL, supra note 118, at 172.
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of many, they achieved both goals. The most striking examples of suc-
cess with the first goal are the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials
following the end of World War II. Although Realism was not treated
like Communism in the decade following the end of the war,129 in the
eyes of at least a few legal academics the belief in Realism was nearly
equated with treason. 130 Given the times and this vociferous criticism,
Realism eventually succumbed.
In 1940, Professor Karl Llewellyn, the leading Realist, recanted
his statements that "the heart and core of jurisprudence" is something
besides "right guidance;"' 31 and in his 1939 edition of Law And The
Modern Mind, Jerome Frank called natural law the "basis for modem
civilization."'1 32 Finally, in 1942, Professor Max Radin of Berkeley's
Boalt Hall apologized for possibly creating the inference in his writ-
ings that "ideas like wrong and right, or any ideas, are worthless or
meaningless."' 33 But as we shall see, Professor Radin's apology came
too late.
What caused the demise of Realism? It is doubtful that the dis-
pute over Realism's skepticism or ambivalence about moral proposi-
tions was sufficient to end the movement. But that was not the only
objection to Realism born from the rise of totalitarian regimes in Eu-
rope and Asia. The central tenets of Realism, including the Realist
teaching that judges make law and that law is indeterminate, appar-
ently conflict with three fundamental ideals cherished by most Ameri-
cans. First, the teaching that judges make law, but they are not bound
by it, may appear inconsistent with the foundational belief upon which
American democracy is built: The people select the rules by which
they are governed. Second, these two teachings (that judges make,
but are not bound by, law) can be seen as conflicting with the concep-
tion of the judiciary as reinforcing representative democracy, rather
than undermining it. Third, by emphasizing judicial discretion in the
making of law, and that judges are human, Legal Realism is easily
seen as undermining popular faith in our system as a government of
129. For example, Realists were not summoned before a Congressional committee and
asked, "Are you now or have you ever been a Realist?"
130. See, eg., Francis E. Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Re-
spective Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. LJ. 493 (1942)
(portraying Realism as a "might makes right" philosophy that could destroy democracy).
131. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L.
REv. 581, 603 (1940).
132. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xvii, XX (1939); see also JEROME
FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM: A PHILOSOPHY FOR FREE AMERICANS 295 (1945).
133. Max Radin, In Defense of an Unsystematic Science of Law, 51 YALE L.J. 1269,
1275 (1942).
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laws, not of men. Viewed in this light, Legal Realism would support,
not resist, the ascendance of totalitarianism in America.
With the recanting of Realism's ambivalence about moral pro-
positions, with the decline of empirical legal research, and with the
apparent conflict between Realism's basic tenets and popular concep-
tions of our democracy, Legal Realism suffered and died as an identi-
fiable movement in American academic law. Nevertheless, Realism
continued to influence American law in a variety of ways.
On June 6, 1940, William H. Waste, Chief Justice of California,
died at his home in Berkeley, California.134 Four days later, Governor
Culbert Olson nominated Justice Phil S. Gibson to be Chief Justice. 135
This left a vacant seat on the bench of the California Supreme Court.
Governor Olson nominated the Legal Realist, Professor Max Radin
of Boalt Hall, to fill this vacancy.' 36
Radin's nomination, though promptly endorsed by Justice Felix
Frankfurter and by Thurman Arnold, generated immediate contro-
versy. His outspoken Realist views, and his political liberalism, nur-
tured the charge that Professor Radin's "Americanism was open to
challenge."'1 37 Three weeks after receiving the nomination, the Judi-
cial Qualifications Commission-consisting of Chief Justice Gibson,
Presiding Justice Nourse of the District Court of Appeal, and Earl
Warren, then Attorney General of California-by a vote of two to
one, refused to confirm Radin.138
In the midst of renewed controversy, Professor Radin asked Gov-
ernor Olson to withdraw his name from further consideration. Ra-
din's name was withdrawn and on August 1, 1940, Governor Olson
nominated Professor Radin's colleague, Professor Roger Traynor, to
the vacant seat on the California Supreme Court.
1. Reasoned Elaboration and Neutral Principles
Professor Traynor never joined the public debate over the com-
patibility of Realism with the American system of government, nor
did he publicly speak about Realism's supposed potential for support-
ing totalitarian regimes. Professor Traynor's expertise was primarily
in taxation and his scholarly writing did not directly address the de-
134. 2 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 69.
135. Id. at 173.
136. Malcolm Smith, The California Method of Selecting Judges, 3 STAN. L. REv. 571,
591 (1951).
137. Id. at 593 (describing Radin's refutation of these charges).
138. Id. at 592. Chief Justice Gibson voted in favor of confirmation. Id.
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bate about Realism or Realist theory. Realism's goal was "to define
and discredit classical legal theory and practice and to offer in their
place a more philosophically and politically enlightened jurispru-
dence.' u3 9 Professor Traynor's scholarly writing had other goals.
From 1940, when he was confirmed as an Associate Justice of the
California Supreme Court, to 1956, Justice Traynor did not write
about the judicial process in any extra-judicial publication. Between
1956 and his retirement from the Court in 1970, Justice Traynor pub-
lished twenty-one articles on various aspects of the judicial process. 140
He published three more while he was a Professor at Hastings College
of the Law.' 4' These two dozen articles form the corpus of his off-
bench writing about the judicial process. There is no book in the
genre of Cardozo's The Nature Of The Judicial Process that sums up
his views on the judge's role in American democracy. But before we
turn to Traynor's judicial philosophy, we must first briefly revisit the
"moralist" reaction to Realism and the intellectual response to that
criticism that has come to be known as "Reasoned Elaboration," for
these events influenced Roger Traynor's theories about the judicial
process.
As discussed above, there was an intellectual rebellion against
Realism that focused, at first, on its perceived "moral relativism."' 42
Realism was charged with being the intellectual harbinger of totalitar-
ianism.143 The rebellion produced renewed interest in "the moral
claims of settled law in a constitutional democracy."' 4
At approximately the same time, there was growing scholarly
concern with the United States Supreme Court. "The Supreme
Court," Professor White wrote, "in invalidating certain New Deal leg-
islative programs, wrote several opinions that gave to the Constitution
various interpretations characterized by many commentators as inept
or disingenuous."' 45 Realism, as we have seen, was not as successful
at suggesting how judges should decide cases as it was in its critique of
classical theory and practice. If law is indeterminate, then how should
139. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 88, at xiii-iv.
140. See infra Appendix A. These twenty-one articles are listed as articles 1-21.
141. Id. These three articles are listed as articles 22-24.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 121-30.
144. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REv. 929,
937 (1951).
145. G. Edward White, The Evolution Of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criti-
cism And Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279, 283 (1973). I have relied on Professor
White's excellent article for the historical evolution of Reasoned Elaboration. See also
Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 952-58.
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judges decide cases? By applying their own values or conception of
the public good? And how does this all square with democracy, the
rule of law, and the proper role of courts in our system? Few of the
Realists devoted any systematic effort to answering these questions. 146
The few who offered answers, except perhaps for Professor Felix
Cohen,147 had little to say that was either as comprehensive or as in-
sightful as the Realist critique.148 The Supreme Court's allegedly in-
ept or disingenuous handling of the New Deal programs and the
rebellion against Realism and its failure to provide meaningful gui-
dance on the judicial role stimulated a steady stream of scholarship
aimed at distinguishing America from the totalitarian regimes of the
Second World War, and at creating a model for decision-making in the
Supreme Court of the United States.
This body of scholarship focused on the articulation of the rea-
soning process in appellate opinions. This process, it was argued,
"highlighted the difference between a society, such as America, where
law allegedly attempted to conform to public notions of reasonable-
ness and fairness, and totalitarian regimes where law was synonymous
with the fiats of officials.1 149 Articulation of the reasoning process in
opinions also promised to produce institutional constraints on deci-
sion-making in the Supreme Court. These restraints are important, of
course, for they are designed to perform the checking function classi-
cal theory attributes to law. But since the Realists persuasively ar-
gued that the checking function of law is mostly myth (as law is
indeterminate), it is apparent that unless a judge's choice is con-
strained in meaningful ways, the rule of law means nothing more than
rule by judges.
The scholarly discussion in the 1950's produced a model of the
reasoning process for use in Supreme Court opinions: it is called
"Reasoned Elaboration. 1 5 0 Its tenets may be summarized as
146. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 88, at 170.
147. See FELIX C. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS: AN ESSAY ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM (1933) (advocating juristic philosophy fusing scientific
investigation with search for ultimate moral truth).
148. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 88, at 165-67 (observing weakness of
Realists in fashioning a program for judicial decision-making, and acknowledging that their
focus on narrowing applicability of legal rules has become an important facet of jurispru-
dential reform).
149. White, supra note 145, at 285-86.
150. This is the name given to the model in 1958 by Professors Hart and Sacks in their
famous casebook on the legal process: HENRY A. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 161 (tent. ed.
1958). Although the casebook was never published during the lifetimes of the authors, it
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follows: 151
1. Judges must give reasons for their decisions;
2. These reasons must be set forth in a detailed and coherent
manner;
3. They must exemplify "the maturing of collective thought;"' 5 2
and,
4. The Court must adequately demonstrate that its decisions, in the
area of constitutional law, were vehicles for the expression of the
ultimate social preferences of contemporary society.
The first and second of these prerequisites are not problematic.
They need no discussion. It is the third element, initially articulated
by Professor Hart, that is the hallmark of this theory. It is also the
most difficult to understand. In essence, Professor Hart argued that
given adequate time and reflection, the collective thinking of judges
about particular cases could mature into something like "reason" as
an objective concept.153 This "maturing of collective thought" is what
supposedly frees the judiciary from the Realist criticism that judges'
choices inevitably reflect their human bias.154 The fourth element in-
fuses into the process the value preferences of contemporary Ameri-
can society. The binding together of elements three and four
supposedly produces an objective "reasonable" solution to constitu-
tional controversies that reflects the value preferences of the time.
This "reasonable" solution could be reached, despite the judges'
human biases, if they approach their task with intellectual detachment
and disinterestedness, and if they take the time and make the effort
openly to discuss their views of cases, heed the views of their fellow
judges, and articulate as fully as possible the resulting consensus. 155
Putting aside the risk of oversimplification, Reasoned Elabora-
tion boils down to the claim that there is a "common law" of the Con-
was posthumously published by The Foundation Press in 1994: HENRY A. HART & AL-
BERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICA-
TION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994). This book has
influenced thinking about the legal process since it began circulating in a mimeographed
"tentative edition." See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, The Making of the Legal
Process, 107 HARV. L. REv. 2031, 2046-55 (1994).
151. This summary relies on Professor White's synopsis of the tenets of Reasoned
Elaboration. White, supra note 145, at 286-91.
152. This requirement was created by Professor Hart in a law review article: Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Supreme Cour4 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARv. L. REv. 84, 100 (1959).
153. Id. at 100, 122-25.
154. See id. at 99-100, 122-25; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles Of Consti-
tutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1959).
155. Id.
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stitution that is objectively identifiable, and that reflects the
contemporary value preferences of American society. Accordingly,
the Court must adjudicate constitutional cases by applying constitu-
tional common law (the product of the third and fourth tenets) in an
opinion that articulates its reasoning (tenet 1) in a detailed and coher-
ent manner (tenet 2). Such an opinion, of course, makes a contribu-
tion to "the maturing of collective thought" (tenet 3) and
demonstrates that the opinion is a vehicle "for the expression of the
ultimate social preferences of contemporary society" (tenet 4) for fu-
ture use in the judicial process as it relates to constitutional law.
One of the last of the major contributions to Reasoned Elabora-
tion theory was made by Professor Herbert Wechsler in his 1959
Holmes Lecture, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law.156
Professor Wechsler focused on the process of extracting principles
from (what I have called) the constitutional common law that are le-
gitimately usable to decide the case at hand.157 In other words, the
goal of Professor Wechsler's inquiry was to articulate the process by
which a judge could determine the ratio decidendi of the constitutional
common law.158
Constitutional law, like the common law, presents judges with
choices among competing values and policies. Only decisions that are
based "on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality"' 59 are "gen-
156. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
157. See id. at 15-17. The crucial point of constitutional decision-making, according to
Professor Wechsler, is when the judge seeks to relate the case under consideration to past
relevant cases and those which may come before the court in the future. This is the famil-
iar process of extracting the relevant principle from precedent to use in the case at hand
and in future cases. See id.
158. For other discussions of the process that should be used for common law prece-
dent, see M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 50-76 (1988); JOSEPH RAz,
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 183-89 (1979) (asserting positivist argument that principles of law
are derived from individual values rather than natural law); A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio
Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURIS-
PRUDENCE 148 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (explaining the limiting force of binding precedent
and its relation to morality); Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a
Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930) (explaining the process of deduction); A.L. Goodhart, The
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 117 (1959) (asserting that the ratio decidendi
of a case may be deduced by identifying facts recognized as material by the judge); A.W.B.
Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case (pts. 1 & 2), 21 MOD. L. REV. 155 (1958), 22 MOD.
L. REV. 453 (1959) (criticizing the methods advanced by Goodhart and others for identify-
ing the ratio decidendi of a case); Julius Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidend4 22 MOD.
L. REV. 597 (1959) (explaining that stare decisis and reasoned elaboration ensure adher-
ence to lessons of the past while allowing for contemporary insight within judicial decision-
making).
159. Wechsler, supra note 156, at 15.
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uinely principled.' 160 To be of adequate generality, the principle must
"transcend any immediate result that is involved.' 16' A principled
choice between these "confict[s] in human claims of high dimen-
sion 62 is a decision in which this ultimate conflict is perceived, ar-
ticulated, and resolved in a manner that gives guidance for future
similar disputes. A neutral choice means that the judge subordinates
her personal predilections to the competing values presented in the
case.
163
This appears to be a version of common law legal process theory
clothed in constitutional apparel. Nevertheless, its application to con-
stitutional law was an important contribution to the modem debate
about constitutional theory.
One of Reasoned Elaboration's quests was for constitutional
opinions that articulated, in a reasoned way, the general moral princi-
ples that bind Americans together. Although it thus addresses the
"moral relativism" of the Realists and distinguishes America from the
totalitarian regimes of the Second World War, it is less successful in
meeting its second goal: an answer to the Realist argument that
human bias has more to do with judicial decisions than does a concept
of law, precedent or principle. "In the world of the Reasoned
Elaborationists," Professor White explained, "judges neither found
law in the old-fashioned sense nor made it in the sense of the Realists;
they reasoned toward it and then articulated their reasoning
processes."'164
The Realists, of course, rejected this conception of the judicial
process as being little more than romantic nonsense. Thurman Ar-
nold, for example, scoffed "that there is no such process as [the matur-
ing of collective thought], and there never has been."' 65 And one can
easily imagine how Jerome Frank would respond to the Reasoned
Elaborationists' claim about objectivity and neutral principles: "Re-
ally?" Professor Wechsler's neutral principles, Llewellyn and Frank
would probably answer, function in the same manner as a common
160. Id.
161. Id. at 19.
162. Id. at 34.
163. Conversely, an unprincipled decision is made when the conflict in values is not
perceived, not articulated, or not resolved in a manner that guides future disputes. A non-
neutral choice is one in which judges allow their personal values to affect the choice.
164. White, supra note 145, at 289.
165. Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1312 (1960)
(criticism of Hart, supra note 152, by the unreconstructed Realist (Professor, Judge, Law-
yer) Thurman Arnold, a founding partner of the law firm of Arnold, Fortas & Porter).
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law principle. A concept's function, not its label, is its important attri-
bute. Judges create new constitutional law with the opinion, announc-
ing their choice among competing values in precisely the same way
judges make law in the common law system. This is so regardless of
how carefully they articulate everything, how closely they reason
everything, and how successfully they believe they have subordinated
their personal values. 166 As Professor Ely points out, the Neutral
Principles theory "[does] not provide a source of substantive con-
tent."167 Thus, judges are left to create the substance of the suppos-
edly "neutral principles."
2. Traynor on Reasoned Elaboration and "Neutral Principles"
We now turn to Roger Traynor. What did Justice Traynor think
about Professor Wechsler's "neutral principles"? 168 They "sound pure
and simple to a judge who confronts problems ridden with impurities
and complications.' 69 They sounded to him like "magic words.' 170
But the elusiveness of the principles' 7' and their lack of substantive
content were not his only reservations. As far as the common law
process is concerned, Traynor was troubled by Professor Wechsler's
assumption (which was shared by Professor Hart in The Time
Chart)172 that generalized principles that endure over time should be
used to decide cases.' 73 Traynor agreed that courts have an obligation
166. However, Judge Frank would undoubtedly also argue that they could never be
successful in actually subordinating their personal values.
167. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 55 (1980).
168. Traynor's only published discussion of Wechsler's "neutral principles" is contained
in his article No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CAL. L. REV. 615, 623-25 (1961)
[hereinafter Traynor, No Magic Words].
169. Id. at 624.
170. Id.
171. Speaking of the highly generalized principles, Justice Traynor wrote:
There is no great quarrel with a solution that proceeds from realistic reasoning if
it is reasonably clearly set forth. There can be serious quarrel, however, even
with a decision that appears just on its face, if it floats in language so inadequate
or ambiguous as to afford no clear insight into the nature of the competing inter-
ests, no clear vision of their relation to the contemporary environment, and hence
no reliable clues for the determination of cases involving kindred competing in-
terests in dissimilar fact contexts.
Roger J. Traynor, Better Days in Court for a New Day's Problems, 17 VAND. L. REv. 109,
121 (1963) [hereinafter Traynor, Better Days in Court].
172. As we have seen, Professor Hart called for the use of "impersonal and durable
principles" in constitutional adjudication. Hart, supra note 152, at 99.
173. Traynor, supra note 168, at 624-25.
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to articulate their decisions in general terms.174 But inhis view, judge-
made law should be constantly reviewed for its contemporary utility.
In a rapidly changing world, today's principles may not survive to-
morrow's changes. 175
But there is a deeper disagreement here. Hart and Wechsler con-
ceive of "durability" as a necessary attribute of the principles that
should be used by the United States Supreme Court in constitutional
decision-making. 176 Because of their enduring quality, the principles
Hart and Wechsler envisioned are meant to control future cases. Jus-
tice Traynor articulates principles and theories in his opinions to dis-
close how he reaches his decisions and why. These principles and
theories, as we shall see, perform an explanatory function that
breathes life into the institutional constraints that are fueled by the
expectations of colleagues, the bar, the academy, and the general pub-
lic. 177 These explanations also provide relevant data for predicting
what the court may do in a similar case in the future; but, according to
Traynor, the principles they explain are always subject to review and
revision as new situations may require. As we shall see, unless other
considerations win the day, Traynor's principles endure only so long as
they serve the goals of the law.178 But Justice Traynor, unlike Hart
and Wechsler, does not use principle and theory as a method of con-
trolling the course of future litigation.179 "A judge is constrained not
only to heed the relevant judicial past in arriving at a decision," Justice
174. E.g., id. at 625, 627-28 (stating that judges sometimes devise guiding principles
through independent research).
175. See e.g., id at 625-26 (arguing that judges "must achieve some acceleration in the
death rate of antiquities").
176. See Hart, supra note 152, at 99; Wechsler, supra note 154, at 15-19.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 281-91, 320-24.
178. The opinion may also serve to stimulate legislative action. See Roger J. Traynor,
The Unguarded Affairs of the Semikempt Mistress, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 498-99 (1965)
[hereinafter Traynor, Unguarded Affairs].
179. See Roger J. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; Or Hard Cases Can Make
Good Law, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 223, 224-25 (1962) [hereinafter Traynor, La Rude Vital
(quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, TrE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECDING APPEALS 389
(1960)):
"[T]here is a duty, case by case, to rework all language, ancient or recent, into
newer, cleaner guidance, a Duty of On-going Judicial Review of Prior Judicial
Decision." He rightly reminds us that "a court ought always to be slow in un-
charted territory, and, in such territory, ought to be narrow, again and again, in
any ground of decision . . . ." But he concludes, "once there is clearish ligh4 a
court should make effort to state an even broader line for guidance. And ... so
long as each such line is promptly and overtly checked up and checked on and at
need rephrased on each subsequent occasion of new illumination, such informed
questing after broader lines is of the essence of good appellate judging.
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Traynor wrote in 1967, "but also to arrive at it within as straight and
narrow a path as possible .... [T]he well-tempered decision knows
how to take graceful leave of a dark landmark that is no longer on its
mark, but takes care to refrain from all-purpose guidance for all that
lies ahead."'180 Thus,. although Traynor agreed with the first and sec-
ond tenets of Reasoned Elaboration, he did not believe that "neutral
principles" or the third and fourth tenets (at least as proposed by Hart
and Wechsler) were essential (or perhaps even of value) to the com-
mon law process. We will come back to this point after we have taken
a closer look at the judicial philosophy of Roger Traynor.
IV. Roger Traynor on the Judicial Process
A. Introduction
As noted before, in nearly a quarter of a century Roger Traynor
wrote two dozen articles on the legal process. This amounts, on the
average, to one article each year for twenty-four years. Like the lec-
tures given by Holmes and Cardozo, with one exception, the articles
written while Roger Traynor was on the bench were initially delivered
as invited lectures.' 8 ' This series of articles began in 1956 with his
lecture, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, delivered on
the occasion of the dedication of the new College of Law building at
the University of Illinois. 182 The last article was a lecture delivered at
a colloquium on Methods of Law Reform held at the University of
Warwick in 1980, while Traynor was a Professor at Hastings. 8 3 Given
his judicial duties, the number of opinions he wrote, and his articles on
other topics, it is understandable that many of these articles plow
much of the same ground. Sometimes most of the article is new, but
on other occasions the new ideas are worked into previously pub-
lished material so skillfully that it is revealed only after careful study.
In others, the new material stands out so boldly that it cannot be
missed. Unfortunately, Justice Traynor never consolidated his think-
180. Roger J. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, 21 ARK. L. REV. 287, 291
(1967) [hereinafter Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision]; see also Roger J. Tray-
nor, The Courts: Interweavers in the Reformation of Law, 32 SASK. L. REV. 201, 203-04
(1967) [hereinafter Traynor, The Interweavers] (asserting that judges advance slowly in
their opinions, offering short-term guidance rather than general principles); Traynor,
Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 262-63 (urging "circumspection in the evolution
of precedents").
181. See infra Appendix A.
182. Traynor, Law and Social Change, supra note 14.
183. This was the Transatlantic Reflections lecture, supra note 14. The lecture was de-
livered at the University of Warwick, Coventry, England on September 11, 1979. Id.
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ing into a book on the judicial process.
What follows is a statement of Roger Traynor's judicial philoso-
phy gleaned from a study of these articles, together with an analysis of
that philosophy cast in terms of contemporary legal process theory.
Traynor's judicial philosophy may be broken down into three mu-
tually dependent themes: the creative role of judges; the sources of
judge-made law; and the process by which the judge exercises the cre-
ative powers to mold the sources of the law into new doctrine. In
addition, we will consider Justice Traynor's response to contemporary
criticism of judicial law-making.
B. The Creative Role Of Judges
Although few lawyers, but many members of the general public,
may still believe that judges do not make law, Roger Traynor, like
Holmes, Cardozo, Pound and the Realists, repeatedly taught us that
they do. He also shared the Realists' view that society is in rapid flux,
and that the law "should keep pace with the times."'184 And when
legislation fails to solve a new problem, and that problem winds its
way to court, the burden falls on the judges to "hammer out new
rules" to govern the case at hand.185
The judge's lawmaking function is a central theme in Justice Tray-
nor's view of the judicial process. 8 6 Unless one is willing to argue
that Holmes, Cardozo, Traynor, and a multitude of other judges mis-
understand the nature of their work, the fact that judges create new
law should now be firmly established in American law. One can, of
course, debate whether judges ought to make law at a given time or
whether judges should ever do so. But the fact that they do make law
means that the contrary view either is myth' 87 or is based upon a dif-
184. Traynor, Some Open Questions, supra note 14.
185. Traynor, Law And Social Change, supra note 14, at 232.
186. The judge's lawmaking work is discussed from the first to the last of Justice Tray-
nor's off-bench writing on the judicial process. See, eg., Traynor, Law And Social Change,
supra note 14, at 232 (discussing the judge's duty to "hammer out new rules"); Traynor,
Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 259. In the latter article, Justice Traynor wrote,
"Unlike Moli~re's bourgeois gentilhomme, who was astonished to learn that his customary
language indeed made prose, a modern judge is quite aware that his customary language
indeed makes law." Id.
187. "Amid so much conflict, the fiction that a court does not make law is now about as
hallowed as a decayed and fallen tree." Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14,
at 258. Much earlier he wrote, "[1]ike many another myth, the myth that judges discovered
rather than created law, surviving well into the twentieth century, engendered rituals that
have outlived it." Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 290.
In another article, with his typical good humor, Traynor makes the same point (which
appears throughout his writings on the judicial process) in words that could not be omitted
August 1995]
ferent conception of the judicial transaction.
Justice Traynor identified four settings in which judges make law.
The least problematic is when the judge applies existing precedent to
new facts. When a court, for example, "extends an old rule about
some dobbin to a novel Pegasus,' 188 the resulting precedent is, in a
limited sense, creative, for we now have judge-made law concerning a
Pegasus when none existed before. Nevertheless, if one adheres to
the classical Blackstonian view of the legal process, they will argue
that the new precedent creates nothing more than a new application
of an old rule. Whichever view one takes of this transaction (law-
making or law-applying), all agree that this is the essence of our com-
mon law system; and that a judge generally should apply existing pre-
cedent to new facts in deciding cases.
Stare decisis signifies the basic characteristic of the judicial process
that differentiates it from the legislative process. In the legislative
process there is neither beginning nor end: It is an endless free-
wheeling experiment, without institutional constraints, that may
have rational origins and procedures and goals or that may lack
them. In contrast a judge invariably takes precedent as his starting-
point; he is constrained to arrive at a decision in the context of an-
cestral judicial experience .... 189
from this study:
I would not labor these observations were it not that they lead us to tangential
light on our inquiry into the double standard of vigil. That double standard is
fostered, perhaps inadvertently, by a dwindling but still highly vocal group who
view with alarm any continuing development of the common law. In the mental
graveyard of this set, the law is set forth in two kinds of tablets with no correla-
tion between them. There are statutory tablets, of flexible material, cut to order
in all sizes and shapes, from the skimpy to the outlandish. Legislators thus appear
as normally creative, revising or liquidating their tablets as they see fit. In sup-
posed antithesis are common-law stone tablets of mysterious origin that have al-
ways been where they are, complete with slots in which a judge deposits his
question to receive in return the applicable rule of law, preferably no more than
one. In this view, though judges resort to legerdeplume to create an illusion of
kinship between burned-out coals of ancient sapience and the electric eels of un-
precedented problems, they do not now nor did they ever create law. Before the
judges the stone tablets were, presumably, concealed in the bushes.
Traynor, Unguarded Affairs, supra note 178, at 490.
188. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 259.
189. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 290. He further
explains:
Unlike the legislator, whose lawmaking knows no bounds, the judge stays close to
his house of the law in the bounds of stare decisis. He invariably takes precedent
as his starting-point: he is constrained to arrive at a decision in the context of
ancestral judicial experience; the given decisions, or lacking these, the given dicta,
or lacking these, the given clues.
Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 203.
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Judges also make law when they interpret statutes. In the typical
situation, judges use conventional techniques to interpret a statute
they then apply to a new set of facts. This occurs, for example, when
an apparently absolute phrase is interpreted as being subject to quali-
fications implicit in the context of the whole statute.190 Thus, in
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States'91 the Supreme Court held
that a statute forbidding encouragement to aliens to migrate to this
country to perform services of any kind does not apply to the employ-
ment of a clergyman by a church. This type of law-making is analo-
gous to the law-making resulting from the application of precedent to
new facts; it also is subject to the same difference in conception. 192
But judges also work creatively with statutes in a very different
way. "Statutes, like precedents may be radioactive, their emanations
expanding with the times."'1 93 But "[w]e have been slow," Justice
Traynor observed,
in expanding the connotations of their own terms to keep pace with
the incessant inventiveness of our economy. We forget that legisla-
tures are neither omnipresent nor omniscient. Whatever their alert-
ness to the times, the currency of their statutes begins to depreciate
the moment they are enacted. Even if they were in perpetual ses-
sion they could not possibly enact all the postscripts to yesterday's
regulations that the events of each day would suggest. And if some
machine could conceivably be devised to tabulate such postscripts
they would be self-defeating, for their very numbers would defy in-
telligent application ....
... If in many fields it is impossible to prophesy forthcoming events
and idle to tabulate actual ones, we must expect our statutory laws
to become increasingly pliable to creative judicial elaboration. 94
In other words, the meaning of a statute, like the meaning of a
constitutional provision, may change over time. This process of adapt-
ing statutes to entirely new situations, though the new facts could not
possibly have been contemplated by the legislature, is properly a crea-
tive activity of judges. As an example of this creativity, Justice Tray-
nor uses the California Supreme Court's interpretation of an 1872
190. Roger J. Traynor, Comment on the Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTrru-
TIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 48,62-64 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959) [hereinafter Tray-
nor, Courts and Lawmaking] (speaking of judges' "ingenuity" in applying statutes to
unforeseen fact situations).
191. 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892).
192. See Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 616-17.
193. Traynor, Courts and Lawmaking, supra note 190, at 59.
194. Id. at 60; see also Traynor, Better Days In Court, supra note 171, at 23 (cautioning
against passive judicial "fending" of statutes); Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at
617-19 (stating that judges must engage in "judicial elaboration" when applying statutes to
situations not anticipated by the drafters).
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statute authorizing service of process on foreign corporations doing
business in the state. Rather than freeze the interpretation of the stat-
ute to the limits of jurisdiction recognized in 1872, the Court inter-
prets the provision to keep up with the changing jurisdictional
concepts of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.195
Although this form of judicial creativity is seldom discussed, and
perhaps more rarely practiced, it too probably would draw criticism
from the traditional-classical point of view. If the new problem is not
within the "legislative intent," then the extension of the statute, so the
argument would go, should be left to new legislation. Justice Tray-
nor's reply, we might suppose, would be to point out that there is a
partnership of legislatures and courts in the law-making business; and
while the legislature may be the senior partner, the junior partner ex-
ercises the partnership's full authority until countermanded by the se-
nior partner's will. "The judiciary must," Justice Traynor explained in
1961, "continue as a co-worker, not a minor competitor of the legisla-
ture in the development of the law. '196
The third arena of judicial creativity lies in the void between pre-
cedent on the one side and statutory law on the other. A judge must
decide cases properly submitted to the court. The common law tradi-
tion does not allow judges to abstain for lack of precedent or statute
governing the case. In this situation, the judge must fill the void with
judge-made law, for, as Justice Traynor stated, "[t]here is now wide
agreement that a judge can and should participate creatively in the
development of the common law."' 97 "Every basic precedent was
thus once made up out of whole cloth woven by a judge.' 98 On the
other hand, as we have seen before, the traditional-classical view as-
serts that judges do not make law, even in this situation. Instead, the
judge finds the omnipresent law awaiting discovery by the law-finding
judge.
A more modern devotee of the classical view would argue that
the judge finds the law in the general principles upon which non-gov-
erning precedent is based. Most modern students of the judicial pro-
cess would agree, as did Justice Traynor,199 that precedent is a source
of judge-made law. If this is so, may the disagreement between the
law-making and the law-finding camps be dismissed as a matter of
195. Traynor, Courts and Lawmaking, supra note 190, at 61.
196. Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 616.
197. Traynor, Courts and Lawmaking, supra note 190, at 52.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 17-21 and note 187.
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semantics? Certainly Traynor, the Realists, Cardozo, Pound, and
Holmes believed this was an issue of substance, rather than a differ-
ence in expression. Once one moves from the narrowest holding of a
case, the level of generalization at which judges stop and extract the
rule or principle they find relevant clearly is a question of choice.
And which of the multitude of cases is to be subjected to this abstrac-
tion procedure? Precedents abound, but not all precedents are of
equal value. This process thus is so full of freedom of choice, so full of
judgment, that the realistic appraisal finds the judge making law from
the elements common to all law. To borrow from the lexicon of the
Realists, all precedent is indeterminate.
The analogy is to the weaver of rugs. Though two weavers may
use identical yarn and the same technique, they will produce carpets
of different quality and pattern depending upon their skill, their imag-
ination, and the goal each has in mind. Each carpet is unique. The
finding theory takes as its metaphor not the cottage industry of the
courtroom and its handwoven creations, but the power looms of in-
dustry and the virtually identical products they make. These can be
found on the shelves in the market places throughout the country.
But new precedent is not ready-made, not virtually the same, and not
found anywhere. It is produced by the judge's labor from materials
partially selected from a nearly boundless supply of precedent and
fashioned into the end product by the creative skill of the judge.
The most controversial of the judge's creative tasks, the last of
the four realms of creativity, is the reformation of the common law-
the replacement of existing precedent with new judge-made law.
"Courts have a creative job to do when they find that a rule has lost its
touch with reality and should be abandoned or reformulated to meet
new conditions and new moral values. 2 00
None of us would disturb the law that is truly and rationally
settled. A courtroom is not a reform school or a laboratory for
smashing the atoms of that accumulated wisdom called precedent.
If the precedent works reasonably well most of the time, we do not
throw it away in a hard case for a rule that might henceforth work
badly most of the time. Yet we should examine old rules regularly,
as a good workman examines the machines to which he is assigned,
to see first if they are properly put together, and then if they are in
good working order.20'
200. Traynor, Law and Social Change, supra note 14, at 232.
201. Roger J. Traynor, Unjustifiable Reliance, 42 MNN. L. REv. 11, 14 (1957).
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If precedent is "ill-conceived, moribund, or obsolete," it is a candidate
for reformation.2 02
The controversy surrounding the overruling of precedent focuses
on the doctrine of stare decisis: in a common law system, it is com-
monly said, courts are generally bound to follow precedent. 20 3 The
doctrine springs from such fundamental ideas as the equality of treat-
ment of litigants,20 4 the need for stability and predictability in the
law20 5 (which promotes certainty in the planning of one's affairs20 6 and
protects the reliance interests of the parties2°7), and judicial econ-
omy. 208 It is also said to promote "the actual and perceived integrity
of the judicial process. ' 20 9 But the doctrine's discipline varies among
common law jurisdictions. Stare decisis was so rigidly followed in
England that the House of Lords considered itself bound by its own
precedents until 1966.210 But generally it is not considered an inexora-
ble command in the United States. "[R]ather, it 'is a principle of pol-
icy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision.' 211 Furthermore, the binding effect of the doctrine varies
by subject matter212 and with the views of individual judges. 213
202. Roger J. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REv. 1, 9 (1977)
[hereinafter Traynor, Judicial Creativity].
203. See generally Robert J. Harris, Judicial Review: Vagaries and Varieties, 38 J. POL.
173 (1976) (an historical analysis); Robert A. Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine
of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied, 31 A.B.A. J. 501 (1945)
(measured application of stare decisis is a "principle of growth" for the common law).
204. E.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (citing "evenhanded" develop-
ment of legal principles as an important policy behind stare decisis).
205. Traynor, La Rude Vita, supra note 179, at 229 (stating that stare decisis engenders
a "stability in the law that has value per se"); see Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
206. Justice Brandeis once observed, "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it
be settled right." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 293, 406 (1932).
207. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827-28.
208. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. Sup. CT. HiST. 15-
17 (stare decisis "makes [udges'] work easier").
209. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827; see Powell, supra note 208, at 15-17.
210. On July 26, 1966, the Lord Chancellor issued a declaration abolishing the rule
adopted by the House of Lords in the nineteenth century that the House is bound by its
own precedent. See DErNs KEENAN, SMrrH AND KEENAN'S ENGLISH LAW 133-34 (8th ed.
1986) (includes a reprint of the declaration).
211. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.
212. "Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in involving property
and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved . . . the opposite is true in
cases... involving procedural and evidentiary rules." Id. at 828.
213. Compare, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327-27 (1969) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (adhering strictly to precedent), with id. at 331 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that
precedent should be abandoned in the face of unforeseen circumstances).
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"[I]mitation of the past, until we have a clear reason for change,"
Holmes stated, "no more needs justification than appetite. It is a form
of the inevitable to be accepted until we have a clear vision of what
different things we want."2 14 Cardozo, on the other hand, apparently
thought judges were fairly tightly bound by the doctrine.215 However,
Traynor believed that precedent regularly should be reviewed with an
eye toward judicial reformation of the common law, a view more in
accordance with Holmes than Cardozo.21 6 Nevertheless, all three
clearly understood that a judge exercises creative law-making powers
when precedent is overruled in favor of new doctrine, and that judges
rightfully exercise this power in our American democracy.
Precedent is overruled with some frequency in most American
jurisdictions. The overruling of precedent seems so obvious an act of
judicial creativity that one might argue that this finally proves that
judges make, and do not find, law. But the traditional law-finding
view explained the overruling phenomenon as an instance of judicial
error in finding the law. In other words, the law was incorrectly found
in the overruled case and it is now replaced by law correctly found.
Few judges, or lawyers, one would hope, would offer this explanation
today.
C. The Sources of Judge-Made Law
Cardozo's judicial creativity was founded on the methods of phi-
losophy, history and sociology, and on the customs of the commu-
nity.21 7 Justice Traynor did not dwell on the sources of judge-made
law. When they were mentioned, he did not use Cardozo's terms and
he usually spoke about them in conjunction with their use. Source
and process were not clearly parsed. But insofar as he separately
spoke of them, he identified the raw materials used to weave new law
as precedent, 21 8 the principles and rules found in relevant (but off-
214. OLIVER W. HOLMES, Holdsworth's English Law, in COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS
285, 290 (1920).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 60, 70-71, 84-85.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
218. E.g., Roger J. Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm of Reason, 7
UTAH L. REV. 157, 159 (1960) [hereinafter Traynor, Badlands] (citing court decisions, stat-
utes, administrative regulations, and legal journals); Roger J. Traynor, Conflict of Laws in
Time: The Sweep of New Rules in Criminal Law, 1967 DuKE L.J. 713, 714 [hereinafter
Traynor, The Sweep of New Rules] (judges mainly use old precedent to weave new prece-
dent); Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 203 (same); Traynor, No Magic Words,
supra note 168, at 620-21 (judges' choices in setting new precedent are between one line of
old precedent or another); Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV.
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point) statutes,219 policy,220 the empirical facts of how the law actually
functions,22' and, though less frequently mentioned, the past, contem-
porary and evolving values, customs and traditions of the people,222
and traditional legal materials.2 23 Even more infrequently, as though
739, 742 (1970) [hereinafter Traynor, Reasoning]; Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra
note 14, at 262 (citing "the given judgments; or lacking these, the given dicta; or lacking
these, the given clues"); Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at
290-91. Precedent is, of course, a form of history.
219. E.g., Traynor, Courts and Lawmaking, supra note 190, at 60-64; Traynor, No
Magic Words, supra note 168, at 617-19; Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-
Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 402 (1968) [hereinafter Traynor, Statutes] (same);
Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 259 (discussing the difficulties of inte-
grating statutes with the common law).
220. E.g., Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 212 (describing the use of pol-
icy and environmental data in judicial lawmaking); Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note
202, at 11-12 (same); Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 749-50 (same); Traynor, Some
Open Questions, supra note 14, at 219 (same); Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra
note 14, at 279-81 (same); Traynor, Law And Social Change, supra note 14, at 234 (assert-
ing that judges confronted with obsolete precedent are "free to weigh competing policies"
in arriving at a solution).
221. E.g., Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 212 (asserting that judges in
their work gain sufficient expertise to decipher scientific studies and use them in the adju-
dicative process when appropriate); Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 11-12
(acknowledging the value of occasional judicial inquiry into "legislative facts," environ-
mental data, and scholarly research as an aid to decision-making in uncharted areas); Tray-
nor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 280 (same); Traynor, Reasoning, supra note
218, at 750 (asserting that judges in their work gain sufficient expertise to decipher scien-
tific studies and use them in the adjudicative process when appropriate); Roger J. Traynor,
What Domesday Books For Emerging Law?, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1105, 1106-11 (1968) [here-
inafter Traynor, Emerging Law] (endorsing the use of behavioral science in the fashioning
of precedent).
222. E.g., Traynor, Badlands, supra note 218, at 160 (community standards are implicit
in legislation); Traynor, Better Days in Court, supra note 171, at 109-10 (common law de-
velops slowly in response to changing human values and desires); Traynor, Emerging Law,
supra note 221, at 1107 (stressing that judges must understand the historical context of
common-law rules in order to advance their evolution in an orderly manner); Traynor, The
Interweavers, supra note 180, at 205 (community standards act as check on improvident
judicial innovations); Traynor, Law and Social Change, supra note 14, at 232 (judges must
sometimes reformulate the law to meet "new moral values"); Traynor, Unjustifiable Reli-
ance, supra note 201, at 23-24 (same); Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 625
(judges must heed "established folk patterns" in fashioning precedent); Traynor, The Well-
Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 291-92 (legal rules should lag slightly behind
social mores, in order to ensure rules are reflective of the development of "seasoned com-
munity values").
223. See Roger J. Traynor, To the Right Honorable Law Reviews, 10 UCLA L. REv. 3,
5-8 (1962) [hereinafter Traynor, Honorable Law Reviews] (discussing the influence of law
reviews on judicial opinion-writing). In addition, Donald P. Barrett tells us that "[Justice
Traynor] followed the law reviews assiduously. Every issue that came to the court library
was first sent to him before being shelved. He was very sensitive to areas where he knew
the professors thought the California Supreme Court theories were cockeyed." Transcript
of Interview with Donald P. Barrett, Research Attorney, Supreme Court of California,
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more out of caution than need, Justice Traynor reminds us that judges,
who are "traditionally above base prejudices," must rise above their
own preconceptions, predilections, and personal interests in deciding
cases.224 "Our great creative judges," Traynor reminds us, "have been
men of outstanding skill, adept at discounting their own predilections
and careful to discount them with conscientious severity. 22 5 The per-
sonal views of the judge thus are not legitimate sources of judge-made
law.
How the raw materials of judicial lawmaking are brought to-
gether, sorted, and molded into new law by the judge concerns the art
of creative judging. But it bears repeating here that Justice Traynor
did not overtly distinguish the art of judging from the sources of
judge-made law.226
D. The Art of Creative Judging
(1) Introduction
Now that we understand Roger Traynor's firm belief that judges
should make law, and that his theory of the judicial process draws no
significant distinction between the sources of the law and the process
the judge should use to make it, we return to the dispute over the
legitimacy of judicial law-making that was raging at the time Professor
Traynor was appointed to the bench.
Classical theory's principal attraction is the ease with which it
conforms to popular conceptions of democracy, the rule of law, and
the proper role of courts in our democracy, and, accordingly, the facile
way it dispenses with the troubling questions surrounding the Realists'
views, shared by Justice Traynor, that judges make law and they are
not realistically constrained by precedent.
How did Justice Traynor respond to the anti-Realist criticism that
the unrestrained judicial creation of law is a form of judicial tyranny
1948-1981, at 12 (May 28, 1986 and July 28, 1986) (by Dorothy Mackay-Collins, Curator/
Archivist, Library, Hastings College of the Law; on file in the Roger J. Traynor Memorial
Room); see McCall, supra note 1, at 742 ("As a justice, he elevated the importance of legal
scholarship by initiating the practice of citing law review articles in California Supreme
Court opinions. He consistently read the work of legal academics and incorporated it into
his thinking.").
. 224. E.g., Traynor, Courts and Lawmaking, supra note 190, at 52; Traynor, Transatlan-
tic Reflections, supra note 14, at 281.
225. Traynor, Courts and Lawmaking, supra note 190, at 52.
226. See, eg., Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 7-12; Traynor, No Magic
Words, supra note 168, at 623-30; Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 262-
65.
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antithetical to "our democracy"? As we have seen, he did not overtly
embrace either the Reasoned Elaboration theory or Professor Wechs-
ler's "neutral principles,"227 the two most prominent theories that re-
sponded to challenges to the creative role of Supreme Court justices
in constitutional law at mid-century. 228 As Reasoned Elaboration ma-
tured, it did not further develop its first and second tenets as con-
straints on judicial choice.229 The focus, instead, was on the third and
fourth requirements: that the reasons given by the judge in the opin-
ion must exemplify the "maturing of collective thought,"230 and that
the court must adequately demonstrate that its decisions are vehicles
for the expression of the ultimate social preferences of contemporary
society (as illustrated by Professor Wechsler's "neutral principles"
theory).231
As we have seen, Justice Traynor took a different path.232 He
rejects Reasoned Elaboration's third and fourth tenets as being incon-
sistent with the creative role of judges in the common law process.
Instead, he emphasizes the critical importance of Reasoned Elabora-
tion's first and second tenets. These two tenets, which can be phrased
as a single coherent-articulation-of-reasons principle, are not unique
to Reasoned Elaboration theory. Although this coherent-articulation-
of-reasons principle is not central to all contemporary legal process
theories, it is embraced, or at least not rejected, by most, if not all, of
them. Nevertheless, neither Holmes, nor Cardozo, nor the Realists
constructed theories that restrained a judge's personal law-making
choice based upon a coherent-articulation-of-reasons principle. Jus-
tice Traynor relies upon this principle as a major force that drives his
judicial-limitation theory.
Though never the subject of a single article, Traynor's judicial-
limitation theory can be extracted from an analysis of his lectures on
the judicial process. Two types of forces apply whenever a judge con-
siders the law he or she should use to decide a given issue. There are
creative forces that urge the judge to create new law, and restraining
forces that counsel the judge to apply existing doctrine. Any decision
227. See supra text accompanying notes 168-180.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 150-55.
229. These two tenets are, first, that judges must give reasons for their decisions and,
second, these reasons must be set forth in a detailed and coherent manner. See supra note
151 and accompanying text.
230. Supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
231. Supra note 155 and accompanying text.
232. For a discussion of Justice Traynor's response to Reasoned Elaboration, see supra
text accompanying notes 168-80.
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the judge makes is the product of the relative strength of these oppos-
ing forces at the time the decision is made. The relative strength of
the creative and restraining forces varies with a number of factors.
Precedent prevails and the judge adheres to the common understand-
ing of existing law when, for example, the forces of repose overpower
what Holmes calls "the felt necessities of the time. '233 On the other
hand, when the creative forces overcome the restraining forces, the
judge creates new law.234 This process applies in all of the situations
described by Justice Traynor as calling for judicial law-making. In
other words, the law a judge uses to resolve a given issue is thus the
product of the creative and restraining forces as calculated by the
judge at that given point in time.
Before we turn to the details of Justice Traynor's theory we must
distinguish two types of criticism commonly aimed at judicial law-
making. The first criticism focuses on the person of the judge deciding
the given case and claims that it is inconsistent with "our democracy"
to give law-making power to this individual.23 5 The second criticism
looks not to the person of the judge, but to the office of the judge and
233. HOLMES, supra note 23, at 1.
234. Frank was one of the primary proponents of the theory of rationalization of opin-
ions. See FRANK, supra note 132, at 159-71; ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST
As REFORMER 44-53 (1985); see also supra note 97 and accompanying text. The creative
law-making forces do not work in one direction. The judge could, for example, overrule
the existing precedent and return to precedent abandoned in the past.
235. The personal characteristics of the judge are the focus of this criticism. See, e.g.,
North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976) (holding that non-lawyer judges may preside in crimi-
nal cases in which incarceration is a possible penalty under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, provided the defendant is given the opportunity to obtain a second
trial, de novo, before a judge who is legally trained.) Issues concerning the personal quali-
fications of the judge typically arise in three settings: (1) proceedings to confirm a person
nominated to a judicial office; (2) proceedings to disqualify a particular judge because of
personal interest or bias with respect to the issues pending before the court; and (3) pro-
ceedings to remove a particular judge from office on grounds personal to the judge. The
controversy over the nomination of Max Radin to the Supreme Court of California (see
supra text accompanying notes 134-38) and Judge Bork to the United States Supreme
Court (see, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, Tim TEMPTING OF AMERICA 267-355 (1990); Ronald D.
Rotunda, The Confirmation Process for Supreme Court Justices in the Modern Era, 37 EM-
ORY LJ. 559,581 (1988)) typify the raising of issues concerning the personal characteristics
of a nominee to judicial office. The need for judges to be personally disinterested in the
issues pending before them is an essential part of the Anglo-American judicial tradition
and is not problematic. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22 (1993).
This issue frequently arises in proceedings to recuse a particular judge. The judicial reten-
tion election of 1986, in which Chief Justice Rose Bird and two Associate Justices were not
retained on the California Supreme Court, illustrates the third way in which disputes over
the personal characteristics of a judge arise. See, e.g., JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE 162-86 (1989); John W. Poulos, Capital Punishment, the Legal Process, and the
Emergence of the Lucas Court in California, 23 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 157, 208-20 (1990).
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claims that it is inconsistent with "our democracy" to give law-making
power to the judicial office.236 Classical theory avoids both criticisms
by denying that judges make law. But once one recognizes that judges
236. "By the eighteenth century," Justice Traynor tells us, "doctrinaire preachments for
the separation of powers had become influential enough to lend credibility to Blackstone's
formidable voice of authority for the proposition that judges were confined to be finders of
mystically pre-existing law within their own narrow domain. The temper of the times dis-
couraged judicial initiative, and in response judges grew timid." Traynor, Statutes, supra
note 219, at 404. Elsewhere, Justice Traynor noted that, "[like many another myth, the
myth that judges discovered rather than created law, surviving well into the twentieth cen-
tury, engendered rituals that have outlived it." Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Deci-
sion, supra note 180, at 290; accord Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling:
A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 535 (1977) [hereinafter Tray-
nor, Quo Vadis]. Later, writing in 1977, he observed that "there are even a few lawyers
who still believe that it is for a judge to state, restate, occasionally expand, or even contort
established precedents, but that he cannot properly create a new one." Traynor, Judicial
Creativity, supra note 203, at 8; see infra note 297.
"The most ironic attacks against courts," Justice Traynor wrote in 1970, "are those that
bemoan their lawmaking .... as an encroachment upon the legislative function .... "
Roger J. Traynor, The Mind Counts, 20 CATH. U. L. REv. 259, 266 (1970) [hereinafter
Traynor, The Mind Counts].
Most of the modern criticism of judicial lawmaking focuses on the judicial role in
constitutional litigation. Commentary on the proper role of the courts in adjudicating con-
stitutional issues in "our democracy" has been one of the dominant themes in the literature
on constitutional law for several decades. Professor John Hart Ely tersely sums up the
issue in the following excerpt from his book, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 167.
In this selection, Professor Ely discusses the difficulty with assigning a creative role to
courts in constitution litigation. The particular type of creative role he is discussing is
"noninterpretivism"-the view that courts are not limited to enforcing norms that "are
stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution .... " Id. at 1.
The second comparative attraction of an interpretivist approach, one that is more
fundamental, derives from the obvious difficulties its opposite number [noninter-
pretivism] encounters in trying to reconcile itself with the underlying democratic
theory of our government. It is true that the United States is not run town meet-
ing style.... But most of the important policy decisions are made by our elected
representatives (or by people accountable to them). Judges, at least federal
judges-while they obviously are not entirely oblivious to popular opinion-are
not elected or reelected. "[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function
that is assigned in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can
it be denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions, born of
the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system. Judicial
review works counter to this characteristic."
Id. at 4 (quoting from ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19 (1962)).
Although judicial lawmaking in areas other than constitutional law poses a different set of
issues, it takes a measure of legal and political sophistication to appreciate those differ-
ences. One can anticipate that many who "bemoan... [judicial] lawmaking .... as an
encroachment upon the legislative function" (Traynor, The Mind Counts, supra) do so on
the ground that it violates "the underlying democratic theory of our government" (ELY,
supra). Indeed, the ease with which judicial lawmaking is identified with an abuse of dem-
ocratic theory may explain why judicial candidates usually profess adherence to the classi-
cal law-applying view of the judicial task in confirmation hearings. See supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
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do and should make law, both criticisms must be confronted. The
problem is obvious: the duties of the judicial office are always per-
formed by individual judges. Recognizing this fact, Justice Traynor
states that a judge must be
painfully aware that a decision will not be saved from being arbi-
trary merely because he is disinterested. He knows well enough
that one entrusted with decision, traditionally above base
prejudices, must also rise above the vanity of stubborn preconcep-
tions, sometimes euphemistically called the courage of one's convic-
tions. He knows well enough that he must severly [sic] discount his
own predilections, of however high grade he regards them, which is
to say he must bring to his intellectual labors a cleansing doubt of
his omniscience, indeed even of his perception ....
• .. [H]e can strive to deepen his inquiry and his reflection
enough to arrive at last at a value judgment as to what the law ought
to be and to spell out why.237
Justice Traynor appears to be acknowledging that a judge's
"cleansed" personal judgment is the key to acceptable judicial law-
making. One cannot realistically distinguish the judge from the judi-
cial office. But individual judges can be true to their office by employ-
ing their own "cleansed" values to find the vital balance between the
creative and restraining forces urging and containing judicial creativ-
ity. This is sacrilege in classical theory. But it resonates with what
Holmes tells us in The Path Of The Law,238 and with Realist theory as
it is spun by Judge Hutcheson23 9 and Professors Llewellyn240 and Ra-
din.241 The assertion that judges decide cases based upon personal
judgment lies at the heart of much of the Realist criticism of classical
theory.242 With the addition of his concept of "cleansing" personal
judgment, this assertion is fundamental to Justice Traynor's theory as
well. With this prerequisite in mind, we turn to the creative and re-
straining factors that are the elements of Justice Traynor's theory of
the process by which judges permissibly make law.
Before we examine what I call the predominantly creative ele-
ments of Justice Traynor's theory, a word of caution is in order. For
our analysis, the predominantly creative elements are pragmatism,
237. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 750-51.
238. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
239. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
240. See e.g., supra text accompanying notes 91-101.
241. Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J.
357 (1925).
242. Though a staunch Realist, such as Jerome Frank, would probably argue that
"cleansing" is not possible. See supra note 234.
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empiricism, intuition, the conception of the world as rapidly changing,
and legal policy. A moment's reflection suggests that many of these
elements might support the status quo as readily as change. But we
are here concerned with their principal tendency and that is to support
judicial creativity. Why is this so?
If the status quo is the judge's goal, existing law may be applied
without resorting to any of these components of Justice Traynor's the-
ory. Stare decisis is sufficient to maintain the status quo. Each of
these creative elements generally draws into question existing law.
Pragmatism, for example, asks whether existing law produces its de-
sired goal. When these elements are employed, judges are usually
contemplating the exercise of their creative powers. If these elements
are ignored, there is little ground to question existing law; and if ex-
isting law is not questioned, it will prevail. Once invoked, however,
each of these elements may confirm that existing law is better than the
proposed new rule. Nevertheless, these elements are considered pri-
marily creative forces because they are necessary, though not suffi-
cient, to move the judge's creative power.
(2) The Predominantly Creative Forces
a. Pragmatism
Justice Traynor's focus is not on the law as theology but on law as
a tie that binds a people together, adjusts their relationships, and as-
sists in achieving their goals.243 It is a pragmatic view of law. Undeni-
ably, this Realist perspective 244 of the judicial process is a
fundamental component of Traynor's philosophy of the judicial pro-
cess. This does not suggest that he abjured theory, for he did not.
Theory is spun to explain and unify, to make the law work; not as an
end in itself. The law has its work, and it is the judge's task to see that
it is done fairly and efficiently. Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, and the
Realists all agree with Traynor's pragmatic view of the law and the
judicial process, though there are undoubtedly differences in the en-
thusiasm with which they embrace it.
Justice Traynor's explanation of how a judge should choose be-
tween alternative rules of apparent equal strength is particularly
revealing:
243. Traynor, Better Days in Court, supra note 171, at 109. "It is from the stuff of
[people's] relationships with one another and with the state that the common law develops,
ostensibly from the cases that formalize their quarrels, but under the surface and over the
years, from the values that formalize their aspirations." Id.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100, and following note 105.
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How can a judge then arrive at a decision one way or the other and
yet avoid being arbitrary? If he has a high sense of judicial respon-
sibility, he is loath to make an arbitrary choice even of acceptably
rational alternatives, for he would thus abdicate the responsibility of
judgment when it proved most difficult. He rejects coin-tossing,
though it would make a great show of neutrality. Then what? ...
He comes to realize how essential it is also that he be intellec-
tually interested in a rational outcome. He cannot remain disori-
ented forever, his mind suspended between alternative passable
solutions. Rather than to take the easy way out via one or the
other, he can strive to deepen his inquiry and his reflection enough
to arrive at last at a value judgment as to what the law ought to be
and to spell out why. In the course of doing so he channels his in-
terest in a rational outcome into an interest in a particular result. In
that limited sense he becomes result-oriented, an honest term to de-
scribe the stubbornly rational search for the optimum decision.
Would we have it otherwise? Would we give up the value judgment
for an abdication of judicial responsibility, for the toss of the two-
faced coin?245
The force of pragmatism appears throughout Justice Traynor's writ-
ings on the judicial process.246
b. Empiricism
Empiricism is pragmatism's chief tool. It is the method of choice
for deciding what works. The common law has always contained an
empirical element. It penetrates into the judicial process as the facts
of the case at hand.24 7 But the empiricism that concerns us here is
what we call the "legislative facts," the facts that support the architec-
ture of a given legal rule. "Why should judges not inquire," Justice
Traynor wrote,
the better to resolve a hard case, into what Kenneth Davis calls the
"legislative facts" or what we might call the environmental data, as
distinguished from selected litigated facts about the parties
245. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 212-13.
246. E.g., Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 203-04, 212-13; Traynor, Rea-
soning, supra note 218, at 750-51; Traynor, La Rude Vita, supra note 179, at 234-35; Tray-
nor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 280-81.
247. Justice Traynor accepted the fact skepticism of the Realist Jerome Frank with this
caveat:
The problem is that the facts are forever gone and no scientific method of inquiry
can ever be devised to produce facsimiles that bring the past to life. The judicial
process deals with probabilities, not facts, and we must therefore be on guard
against making fact skepticism our main preoccupation. However skillfully, how-
ever sensitively we arrange a reproduction of the past, the arrangement is still
that of the theater.
Roger J. Traynor, Fact Skepticism And The Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. Rnv. 635, 636
(1958) [hereinafter Traynor, Fact Skepticism].
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presented with partisan fortissimos and pianissimos? When hard
cases make good law, is it not usually because the judges had before
them the data requisite for informed judgment? Is it not just as
foolish in the judicial process as anywhere else to resolve problems
of enormous factual complexity without adequate data? The alter-
native is to assume the risk of dubious a priori assumptions. The
common law is replete with such assumptions.2 48
Brandeis (another ancestor of Realism),249 Cardozo, 250 Pound,251 and
the Realists252 would enthusiastically agree.
Soundly based empirical studies directly relevant to law, how-
ever, are few and far between. The Realist experience with empiri-
cism, along with other factors such as its relatively high costs,
dampened enthusiasm for empirical legal research for several decades
after the Second World War. Although judges should take empirical
studies where they find them, well-grounded empirical research was
scarce during most of Justice Traynor's tenure on the bench. Never-
theless, empiricism is one of the elements that generally supports legal
creativity in Traynor's theory of the judicial process.2 53
c. Intuition
The common law system does not give judges the luxury of wait-
ing for empirical data, for sound legislative facts, before deciding the
case with a new rule. What are judges to do? Are they bound to
flounder in "dubious a priori assumptions? '2 54 Traynor tells us to set
aside our predilections, our assumptions, and do the best we can.255
And what is that? In judges' "pragmatic search for solutions" 256 they
must use "combinations of analysis and intuition" to arrive at a pro-
248. Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 11-12; see also Traynor, Emerging
Law, supra note 221, at 1105 (suggesting that the law must quicken its pace to keep abreast
of new social developments); Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 626-28 (discuss-
ing the "inadequacies of decision[s] ... uninformed by adequate data"); Traynor, La Rude
Vita, supra note 179, at 235 (cases difficult to decide do not necessarily make bad law).
249. See JOHNSON, supra note 43, at 29-46 for an excellent discussion of Brandeis' con-
tribution to legal theory.
250. Cardozo's "method of sociology" included both pragmatism and empiricism. See,
e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 59, at 65-66.
251. See, e.g., THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 579-
80 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922) (discussing inherent unreliability of evi-
dence in criminal cases).
252. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 88, at 232-36 (discussing history
of law as a social science); HERGET, supra note 53, at 194-217 (same).
253. It is true, of course, that empiricism might support the status quo, but it remains as
an essential aspect of considering the creation of new law.
254. Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 12.
255. HOLMES, supra note 23, and accompanying text.
256. Traynor, Law and Social Change, supra note 14, at 232.
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phetic judgment.257
In his... responsibility of assuring the rational continuity of the
law, a judge may now and again be compelled by reason to arrive at
an innovative decision, in the honorable tradition of ancestral pre-
cedent-setters. Such a decision exemplifies judicial responsibility at
its most challenging. The innovative decision is the most difficult
for a judge to elucidate, for it usually concerns a controversy that
has compelled him to evaluate conflicting interests in terms of a
changing social or economic context. He is himself in the moving
picture of that change, but must somehow view it dispassionately.
That perspective he can achieve only by a long look at the past, in
terms of the present, to evaluate whether once useful precedents are
impaired by obsolescence, or whether there are no useful prece-
dents, and then by a long look at the present in terms of the future, to
evaluate what the long-range prospects of currently visible change
are.258
Intuition substitutes for absent or incomplete empirical data in mak-
ing the pragmatic assessment, and in creating new law.259 The judge
uses intuition, in other words, to construct the "environmental as-
sumptions," the world view, upon which the new rule is based.260
d. Policy
Justice Traynor did not dwell on the use of policy in judicial law-
making.261 But when he spoke of policy, he acknowledged that it may
be a basic consideration in the law-making matrix:
It takes vision to recognize the junctures where markers can best
help those who travel the long trails of the law. Such vision is essen-
tial in the occasional cases where a judge must choose between con-
flicting lines of precedent or, in an unprecedented case, between
conflicting lines of policy....
In such cases, we should not be misled by the half-truth that
policy is a matter for the legislators alone to decide. The word "pol-
icy" has one connotation in the legislature and another in the court.
Legislators can embark on any policy at will, whether wise or expe-
dient or artful, without regard either for the continuity scripts of the
law or for the coherence of their own ticker tapes. A judge, in con-
257. Traynor, Badlands, supra note 218, at 160; see also Traynor, Courts and Lawmak-
ing, supra note 190, at 55-56 (discussing roles of judges and legislatures in fashioning new
law); Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 9 (innovative decisions call for the
judge to "evaluate conflicting interests in terms of a changing social or economic context");
Traynor, La Rude Vita, supra note 179, at 223 (examining problems faced by a judge pre-
siding over a complex case); WHrrE, supra note 7, at 294.
258. Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 8-9 (emphasis added).
259. Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 629.
260. ILd.
261. For a comprehensive discussion of the use of policy in judicial law-making, see
Jom BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS (1983).
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trast, cannot speak unless he is spoken to, and he must mind his
musing when he does so. There is always an area not covered by
legislation in which judges must revise old rules or create new ones,
and in that process policy may be an appropriate and even a basic
consideration 2 62
And in commenting on the judicial restructuring of conflict of laws,
Justice Traynor stated that the "demolition of obsolete theories makes
the judge's task harder, as he works his way out of the wreckage; but it
leaves him free to weigh competing policies without preconceptions
that purport to compel the decision, but in fact do not. '263
Indeed, in his last article on the judicial process, Justice Traynor
called this element "the essential, but narrow, leeway of judicial pol-
icy."' 264 Although policy is a basic consideration in Traynor's world of
judicial law-making, he does not give it the central role it takes in
some of the later theories produced by the Realist Movement. Policy
is a critical element, for example, in the "realistic" theories produced
by Professors Myres McDougal and Harold Laswell at Yale shortly
after Traynor was appointed to the bench, 265 now known as the Law,
Science, and Policy movement.266 But for Roger Traynor, policy is
only one of the many important components of judge-made law.
e. The Rapidly Changing World
Traynor, along with the Realists and Holmes, saw the world in
rapid flux. This was not simply a world view, but an empirical truth:
Roger Traynor sat on the California Supreme Court during one of the
most dynamic periods in California's history.2 67 Because of the "ac-
262. Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 11. The quotation continues as
follows:
The briefs carry the first responsibility in stating the policy at stake and demon-
strating its relevance; but if they fail or fall short in this task, no conscientious
judge will set bounds to his inquiry. If he finds no significant clues in the law
reports or statutes of his own or other jurisdictions, he will not close his eyes to a
pertinent study merely because it was written by an economist or perhaps an an-
thropologist or an engineer.
Id.; see also Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 212 (courts share role with legis-
lature in determining policy); Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 749 (asserting that
courts decide what is policy); Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 280-81
(judges in hard cases must make judgments "as to what the law ought to be").
263. Traynor, Law And Social Change, supra note 14, at 234.
264. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 279.
265. The first comprehensive statement of their theories is found in Harold D. Laswell
& Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the
Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
266. For a general discussion of the Law, Science, and Policy theories of Professors
McDougal and Laswell, see HERGET, supra note 53, at 220-27.
267. WHITE, supra note 7, at 294-95.
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celerating force of social and scientific change," Justice Traynor be-
lieved that lawyers and judges were bound to bring the law "up to a
strength and creativeness equal to the times."' 26 The judge
can no longer invoke with assurance the nearest quieting precedent.
The nearest analogy may seem to him only impertinent. Tried and
half-true formulas will not serve him, for all their show of stability.
He must compose his own mind as he leaves antiquated composi-
tions aside to create some fragments of legal order out of disordered
masses of new data.269
The judge must thus constantly review and update the common law.
Judges must make new law for new situations, for "the felt necessities
of the time."270
Justice Traynor was so concerned with a realistic portrayal of the
judicial process and with burying the law-finding myth that he repeat-
edly emphasized the judge's creative duties. Society was changing at a
rapid rate and legislatures frequently did not manufacture the law
necessary for the new disputes created by new relationships. 271 Judges
thus must fill these ever-present gaps at an escalating rate. This did
not mean that legislatures slept while judges worked. In the modern
world "legislatures have displaced courts as our major lawmakers." 272
But legislatures do not make all the law needed to avoid or resolve the
rapidly developing disputes. Ironically, with the ascending rate of new
legislation, the creative role of judges escalates as well. Judges must
exercise their creative powers over the new statutes-gaps in the stat-
utory provisions must be filled, text must be interpreted, and statutes
must be woven into the corpus of the law.273 When these tasks are
added to the creative job of filling the void typically existing even in a
stable society, between precedent on the one side and statutory law on
the other, the judge is seemingly creating law at a speedy rate.2 74 To
268. Traynor, Better Days In Court, supra note 171, at 109; see also Traynor, La Rude
Vita, supra note 179, at 236 ("Things happen fast in our small world and we who tend the
law must keep pace.").
269. Traynor, Better Days In Court, supra note 171, at 109.
270. HOLMES, supra note 23, at 1.
271. One of Justice Traynor's favorite articles on this topic, judging by the frequency
with which he cited it, was Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't
and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963). Citations to this article may be
found in Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 214; Traynor, The Mind Counts,
supra note 236, at 266; Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 751-52; Traynor, Statutes,
supra note 219, at 427 n.92; Traynor, Unguarded Affairs, supra note 178, at 492 n.12; Tray-
nor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 292 n.12.
272. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 202.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 190-96.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
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this must be added the job of constantly reviewing, repairing, and re-
newing the common law.275 With this addition, it would be facile,
though incorrect, to assume that Justice Traynor counseled his breth-
ren to make law at a break-neck pace. But, as we shall see, there are
constraining forces that slow the pace of judicial creativity in Tray-
nor's theory of the judicial process.
(3) The Predominantly Restraining Forces
Justice Traynor identified seven factors that restrain a judge's
power to create new law: stare decisis, the common law tradition,
what Traynor called "the tenet of lag," the retroactive effect of judicial
decisions, deference to the legislature, internal institutional restraints,
and external institutional restraints. These factors exercise their re-
straining powers in every case in which there is an issue of judge-made
law. And in any given case, the restraining power of any one of these
factors may be sufficient to overcome the creative forces and cause
existing law to prevail. Furthermore, since all of these predominantly
restraining forces are present in all cases in which judge-made law is
challenged, the combined power of the restraining forces may seem
overwhelming in nearly every case. So powerful are these restraining
forces that Justice Traynor warns us that the "real danger to law is not
that judges might take off onward and upward, but that all too many
of them have long since stopped dead in the tracks of their predeces-
sors, with whom they consistently identify themselves save perhaps on
the wearing of wigs. '276 Even when the creative forces are strong
enough to prevail, judge-made "law habitually moves in slow motion,"
for the predominantly restraining forces still exercise their con-
straining power.277 It is to these seven countervailing forces that we
now turn.
a. Stare Decisis
The doctrine of stare decisis, as we have seen, expresses a series
of concerns that counter creativity in the judicial process. 2 78 "The ser-
viceable consistency of stare decisis," Justice Traynor warns, "rightly
discourages the displacement of precedent, absent overwhelming
275. See supra text accompanying notes 200-16.
276. Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 621 (quoting Traynor, Some Open
Questions, supra note 14, at 224); accord Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 744.
277. Traynor, Statutes, supra note 219, at 412.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 203-16.
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countervailing considerations. '279 Stare decisis "not only benefits the
long-range evolution of the law, but also affords substantial protection
against arbitrary judicial decision."2 80 The role of stare decisis in re-
straining judicial creativity is so well known that we may move on to a
related constraint.
b. The Common Law Tradition
Though stare decisis plays a major role in the common law tradi-
tion, there are other equally important components to the culture in
which American judges work. The judge "invariably takes precedent
as his starting-point: he is constrained to arrive at a decision in the
context of ancestral judicial experience." 281 Even in a case of first im-
pression, the judge "arrives at a decision in the context of judicial rea-
soning with recognizable ties to the past; by its kinship thereto it not
only establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent for the future,
but integrates it in the often rewoven but always unbroken line with
the past."282
Justice Traynor eloquently identified the impact of the common
law tradition, apart from the rule of precedent, in his Murray Lecture,
delivered on March 31, 1977, at the University of Iowa College of
Law:283
[B]y the time a case reaches an appellate court there are certainly
two sides to the question, and at times maybe three or more. There
is no way an appellate judge can find an easy answer to the hard
question before him, no way he can spard his mind from thinking,
no way he can abstain from writing an opinion in some measure
original. At the same time he must remain the watchful keeper of
the continuity scripts, entrusted to make the paragraph transitions
from one case to another in the same area, to explain any amplifica-
tion or updating of a familiar text, to justify in detail any departure
therefrom, to elucidate the principles underlying the solution of a
problem without true precedent. Ideally, he should be able to state
his reasons plainly enough to enlighten counsel as to why they won
or lost, and to allay the suspicions of any man in the street who
regards knowledge of the law as no excuse for making it.
Moreover, in his preoccupation with any given script ... the
judge must visualize it in the context of others....
279. Traynor, La Rude Vita, supra note 179, at 229.
280. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 291.
281. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 203; see also Traynor, The Well-
Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 290.
282. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 203; see also Traynor, The Well-
Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 290.
283. Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 1.
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Given the hodgepodge appearance of cases, entirely dependent
on the chance of who undertakes to litigate what, it is no easy task
to ensure a continuity script that will not look like a crazy quilt....
Nothing stands against lunacy in the law but the reasoning judge.28
The common law tradition also teaches judges to arrive at their
decisions "within as straight and narrow a path as possible."285 Even
when the judge does not hew to the past and thus takes "graceful
leave of a dark landmark," the new rule must follow the path of the
arrow, not the grapeshot from a blunderbuss. 86 The common law is
humble in its strength. It is confined by the record and focused on the
issues. The opinion addresses the task at hand and nothing more.
Tradition also binds the judge to weave the rule, whether entirely
or partly new, into the fabric of the law, giving it "the grace of coher-
ent pattern as it evolves. '2 87 Viewed in context, the common law is
evolutionary, even when individual cases appear revolutionary. If the
new rule cannot be integrated into the warp and woof of the law, tra-
dition warns the judge to cast it aside as defective yarn. "Beware of
false prophets," we are warned, "who come to you in sheep's clothing
but inwardly are ravenous wolves. '288 Revolutionary rules, as false
prophets, as wolves, would consume the law, and the judges as well.
The narrowness and precision of the rule and the fact that it flows
from our accepted past affords a judge time to test and to extend,
modify, or retreat as experience suggests.
Thus, although the elements of judicial creativity may urge the
judge to make law at break-neck speed, Justice Traynor uses the meta-
phor of the tortoise to illustrate the proper pace of judicial
creativity:2 89
A decision that has not suffered untimely birth has a reduced risk of
untimely death. Insofar as a court remains uncommitted to unduly
wide implications of a decision, it gains time to inform itself further
284. Id. at 5-6.
285. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 291. Similar
statements frequently appear throughout his writing on the judicial process. See, e.g., Tray-
nor, Quo Vadis, supra note 236, at 537 (1977).
286. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 291.
287. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 203.
288. Matthew 7:15.
289. Justice Traynor said:
It has been known since the days of Aesop that the tortoise can overtake the
zealous hare; La Fontaine has noted that it does so while carrying a burden. The
frailty of the hare is that for all its zeal it tends to become distracted. The strength
of the tortoise is its very burden; it is always in its house of the law.
Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 742. Justice Traynor was fond of the tortoise meta-
phor, and used it frequently. E.g., Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 203; Tray-
nor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 262-63.
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through succeeding cases. It is then better situated to retreat or ad-
vance with a minimum of shock to the evolutionary course of the
law, and hence with a minimum of shock to those who act in reli-
ance upon judicial decisions. The greatest judges of the common
law have proceeded in this way, moving not by fits and starts, but at
the pace of the tortoise that steadily makes advances though it car-
ries the past on its back.29°
It is thus the burden of the judge to keep the pattern of the law
straight, and to interweave the new with the old to make a seamless
whole, with the pace of the tortoise.291
c. The Tenet of Lag
Related to the pace of the tortoise is what Justice Traynor calls
"the tenet of lag": 292 "[T]he law must lag a respectful pace back of
popular mores, not only to insure its own acceptance, but also to delay
formalization of community values until they have become sea-
soned. '' 293 In other words, the function of courts "is not to innovate
changes but only to keep the law responsive to significant changes in
the customs of the community. '294 Once seasoned, however, and if
the legislature fails to make appropriate provisions for them, "a judge
may eventually find it incumbent upon him to articulate rules respon-
sive to long prevalent values and customs. '295 The tenet of lag is "de-
servedly respected," but it should not be used "to retreat from
painstaking analysis within their already great constraints to safe and
unsound repetitions of magic words from antiquated legal lore. '296
d. The Retroactive Effect of Judicial Decisions
Under classical law-finding theory, a decision "discovering" the
common law relates back to the time the ancient custom first became
binding on the community.297 This means that the common law was
290. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 203-04.
291. Donald P. Barrett, a staff attorney at the California Supreme Court for thirty-
three years, worked closely with Justice Traynor. He confirms that this is not simply aca-
demic talk. "Judge Traynor," Mr. Barrett reported, "was particularly concerned with keep-
ing the pattern of the law straight." Transcript of Interview with Donald P. Barrett, supra
note 223, at 12.
292. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 205.
293. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 744; see also Traynor, No Magic Words,
supra note 168, at 621; Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at
292.
294. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 168, at 292.
295. Id.
296. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 744.
297. Speaking of the "ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs, which is
called the common law" (1 BLAcKs-roNE, supra note 17, at *17), Sir William Blackstone
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existent, though not discovered by the courts, at the time the contro-
versy occurred. This thinking generated a venerable rule of the com-
mon law: judicial decisions relate back to the time the dispute arose
and thus govern the relationship between the parties, even though the
governing rule is newly created by the court.298 This "makes a great
deal of common sense," Justice Traynor asserted, "if taken with the
essential grain of salt, that a judicial decision is not hopelessly back-
ward. '299 He also believed that courts appropriately give retroactive
effect to their decisions that overrule previously governing precedent,
provided there are exceptions for undue hardship the rule may im-
pose.300 Indeed, it is commonly understood that the retroactive-appli-
cation rule generally applies to all judicially created law regardless of
whether it announces a pristine new rule, or replaces existing prece-
dent, or functions in any of the additional ways we have seen in our
wrote:
[T]he maxims and customs, so collected, are of higher antiquity than memory or
history can reach: nothing being more difficult than to ascertain the precise be-
ginning and first spring of an ancient and long established custom. Whence it is,
that in our law, the goodness of a custom depends upon its having been used time
out of mind; or, in the solemnity of our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of
man runneth not to the contrary. This it is that gives it its weight and authority:
and of this nature are the maxims and customs which compose the common law,
or lex non scripta, of this kingdom.
Id. at *66 (footnotes omitted). When the judge "finds" the law and applies it in a given
case, it is the ancient maxim and custom that is being enforced. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text. As Justice Traynor notes, this is the common theoretical rationale for
the doctrine that judicial decisions operate retroactively:
Judicial decisions normally operate retroactively. The mundane explanation is
that a judicial decision, relating to events that have already occurred, naturally
looks backward. It makes a great deal of common sense, if taken with the essen-
tial grain of salt, that a judicial decision is not hopelessly backward....
For all too many generations we justified such retroactivity by the prim lore
descended to us through Blackstone that judges do no more than discover law
that marvelously has always existed, awaiting only the judicial pen that would find
the right words for it for all to heed. Once suitably bundled up it was automati-
cally retroactive, given the premise that it had been there all along in the bushes
at the bottom of the garden, The devotees of the discovery theory majestically
dispelled the fractious problem of the overruled decision. The overruling decision
simply displaced it all the way back in time, so that it never had a life it could call
its own.
Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 289-90; accord Traynor,
Quo Vadis, supra note 236, at 534-35.
298. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *66; Traynor, La Rude Vita, supra note 179, at
230-31; see also Traynor, Quo Vadis, supra note 286, at 535.
299. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 289.
300. Traynor, Quo Vadis, supra note 236, at 535; Traynor, The Sweep Of New Rules,
supra note 218, at 714.
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examination of Justice Traynor's world of judicial creativity.301 The
retroactive-application rule begins to restrain judicial creativity when
it creates undue hardship for a party to the litigation:
A judge is mindful of the traditional antipathy toward retroactive
law that springs from its recurring association with injustice and
reckons with the possibility that a retroactive overruling could entail
substantial hardship. He may nevertheless be impelled to make
such an overruling if the hardships it would impose upon those who
have relied upon the precedent appear not so great as the hardships
that would inure to those who would remain saddled with a bad
precedent under a prospective overruling only.3°2
The special hardships may be sourced in either the justifiable reli-
ance on previously settled doctrine or in the injustice created by the
new rule's retroactive application.30 3 The idea that justifiable reliance
may prevent the court from exercising its creativity, as when the hard-
ships the new rule would impose are greater than the hardships that
would accrue to those who would remain saddled with a bad prece-
dent (to borrow from Justice Traynor's example), is grounded in sev-
eral of the same policies supporting stare decisis. 3°4 It is thus easy to
imagine that many judges will refrain from exercising their creative
powers when to do so would trammel the reliance interests of one of
the parties to the litigation.
Much the same can be said when a new judicially created rule
retroactively imposes criminal liability on the appellant. In this situa-
tion, even if there is no reliance interest at stake, most judges would
conclude that the retroactive application of a rule "imposing or ex-
panding criminal liability would be inherently unjust. ' 305 Again, the
harm imposed by the normal retroactive application of the newly cre-
ated rule may restrain judicial creativity. In a world in which there are
no exceptions to the traditional retroactivity rule, judges may well
forego creating the new rule to protect either the reliance interests of
301. See supra text accompanying notes 188-216.
302. Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 9-10; Traynor, La Rude Vita, supra
note 179, at 231; Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 264-70; Traynor, The
Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 291-300.
303. E.g., Traynor, Quo Vadis, supra note 236, at 543 (reliance); id. at 549 (injustice
created by retroactivity); Traynor, The Sweep of New Rules, supra note 218, at 715 (discuss-
ing both justifiable reliance and the injustice created by retroactivity); Traynor, The Well-
Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 293-96 (justifiable reliance); id. at 296 (injus-
tice created by retroactivity).
304. Traynor, La Rude Vita, supra note 179, at 231.
305. Traynor, The Sweep of New Rules, supra note 218, at 716.
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a party or to prevent an injustice. 30 6
Justice Traynor was so concerned with the constraints imposed
upon judicial creativity in these situations that he supported a third
alternative: rather than curb its creative powers when the retroactive
effect of the new rule would unduly harm reliance or justice interests,
the court should abandon the retroactivity rule for that case. In other
words, the new rule should be made to operate purely prospectively.
This technique ... enables a court to reform the law without upset-
ting the reasonable expectations of those who relied on the over-
ruled precedent. Only occasional cases call for such a technique,
but its rational use should foster public respect for courts. Although
usually the technique involves the overruling of a precedent, it may
be appropriate in exceptional situations to make new rules non-ret-
roactive even when they have not been preceded by dissimilar
rules.307
The same technique applies, of course, when injustice would be
created by the retroactively applying the new rule.30 8
e. Deference to the Legislature
One of the first principles of classical theory is that law-making is
exclusively a legislative function.30 9 If one embraces this theory in
pure form, judges may never make law. "That is a matter for the leg-
islature, not the courts," we would be told in a courtroom controlled
by classical doctrine. But one suspects that few judges educated after
the Realist revolution would claim that judges find the law and never
make it. There are, however, subtle emanations from classical theory
that survive to this day. "Like many another myth," Justice Traynor
reminded us, "the myth that judges discovered rather than created
law, surviving well into the twentieth century, engendered rituals that
have outlived it. ' '310
In disguised form, classical theory may be echoed in popular con-
ceptions of "our democracy," of the rule of law, and the proper role of
courts in American society.311 As a Nation, we agree that law is prop-
306. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 265. In Justice Traynor's esti-
mation, in these circumstances "a judge in earlier years usually retreated from making a
new rule that was clearly needed." Id.
307. Id. at 266.
308. Id. Thus, Justice Traynor tells us that the "problem of retroactive versus prospec-
tive application calls for the most sensitive balancing of competing claims to justice in the
area of criminal law. Id.
309. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *49; see supra note 236 and accompany-
ing text.
310. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, supra note 180, at 290.
311. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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erly made by the legislative branch of government. In a one-view
world, the principle of legislative law-making competence is trans-
formed into a belief that the judicial branch of government is incom-
petent to make law. Thus, even today, one may encounter judges who
refuse to create needed rules on the ground that it is beyond the com-
petence of courts to do so, without ever mentioning or thinking about
classical theory.
Justice Traynor, as we have seen, decisively rejected both classical
theory and the notion courts lack competence to make law. He did
not live in a one-view world. Although legislatures have displaced the
courts as the major law-makers in our democracy,312 the judicial
branch retains a portion of the law-making power that was once "the
province mainly of courts. ' 313 Today, the judicial and legislative
branches are partners in the law-making enterprise.3 14 Each has its
realm of relative law-making competence. There is a "symbiotic rela-
tionship," Justice Traynor wrote, "between the court and the
legislature. 315
Their very dissimilarity fosters the vitality of each for the good of
the common law. Lawmaking is too awesome a power to be con-
centrated in a single entity so exposed to external influences as the
usual legislature or so insulated as the usual court.316
Each is governed by its own institutional constraints. Thus the
question judges should ask themselves is not whether they are making
law, but whether it is appropriate for them to do so in the case at
312. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 202; Traynor, Reasoning, supra note
218, at 740-41.
313. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 740.
314. The following quote illustrates Justice Traynor's views:
The judiciary must thus continue as a co-worker, not a minor competitor of the
legislature in the development of the law. There has been too much idle disputa-
tion as to whether one or the other is the primary or ultimate or most social or
most appropriately gowned source of law for the year. It is no longer realistic to
picture the three, some would say four, branches of government as comparable to
those of a hatrack, fixed and therefore incapable of movement, wooden and
therefore incapable of development. The concept of each branch of government
in its wooden place fails us as our thinking deepens. It persists only among those
who also believe in pigeonholes for pigeons that theoretically stay put. In the
past they have been wont to view with alarm as legislatures, which have the run of
the realm for their lawmaking, recurringly sent forth statutes that reached deep
into the common law. Now they are wont to view with alarm any judicial law-
making, such as has gone on for centuries, as an encroachment on the legislative
function.
Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 616.
315. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 262.
316. Id.
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hand. Part of the answer to this question is found in the institutional
restraints we have already discussed and in those we will be discussing
in a moment. Judges are free to make law only within the borders set
by these constraints. But even if a judge remains within these borders,
are there additional considerations that counsel judges to defer to leg-
islative law-making rather than create an otherwise permissible rule?
Although honoring all of the institutional restraints on judicial
creativity, judges must "remain much less than zealous reformers. '317
There are some large scale social problems that are best left to a legis-
lative solution. Judicial intrusion into the area may produce more
problems than it solves. "A judge out of his judicial mind," Justice
Traynor warned, may "fail to consider whether the decree or award
that he relates to a particular grievance will invite wholesale litigation
on a problem that could be rationally resolved only by comprehensive
legislation." 318
Even on that "rare occasion" in which the judge might legiti-
mately intrude into one of these apparently intractable problems to
goad a non-responsive legislature into comprehensive action,
he must first analyze exhaustively the claimed urgency of such ac-
tion, particularly in the context of possibly equally strong competing
claims, no one of which might be fulfilled without cost to the others.
If this hurdle is cleared, he must still analyze whether legislators
would otherwise remain delinquent .... despite the pleas of their
constituents. The second hurdle cleared, he must finally analyze
whether his own decision is one that the legislature can implement
with justice to all and within the time prescribed. 319
Thus, in Traynor's theory of the judicial process, though he insisted
that courts are partners with the legislature in the law-making enter-
prise, there are rare occasions in which courts should hold their crea-
tive powers in abeyance to allow the legislature to enact
comprehensive legislation taking into account the competing claims at
stake. The general rule, however, is that within the constraints that we
are now discussing, judges do and should respond to the forces of cre-
ativity and make new law.
f. Internal Institutional Restraints
In addition to the constraints imposed by the common law envi-
ronment in which American judges work (the restraints associated
with stare decisis, the common law tradition, the tenet of lag, the ret-
317. Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 12.
318. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 282.
319. Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 13.
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roactivity of judicial decisions, and the rare situation in which compre-
hensive legislation is required), there are institutional constraints
imposed by the litigation process itself. The nature of the judicial in-
stitution constrains judges' creative powers. Judges cannot reach out
and make law even if it is required by season and circumstance. They
have no roving commission to do good. Although society may burn
for lack of law, judges, like Nero, may only watch and fiddle. Judges'
powers are exercised only in response to properly presented claims:320
their lawmaking is dependent upon the injury of others and the initia-
tive of lawyers. Judges' creativity thus is limited to cases brought
before the court. Within those cases, judges are tethered by the rec-
ord on appeal,321 by the issues and arguments presented by counsel,322
by obtaining the agreement of a majority of the judges' colleagues, 323
and by the written-opinion requirement.324 Even when the injury is
suffered, the claim is made, and the remedy is right, judges must per-
suade their colleagues to join in the creative act. Though the task of
judging is solitary work, judge-made law is seldom woven by a single
judge alone. The burden of convincing a majority of one's colleagues
is a major impediment to judicial creativity by an appellate court
judge. The decision and the resulting opinion thus bear "the marks of
battle" in the tempering process generated by the collegial process of
a multi-judge court.325 And there is always the possibility of a sepa-
rate opinion, usually a dissent, that will display any weakness in the
320. Thus Justice Traynor wrote, "Many forces constrain review within extremely nar-
row limits. The most immediate constraint is the controversy itself that calls for decision;
even the unprecedented controversy automatically precludes any ambitious excursion be-
yond its own context." Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 620.
321. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 742.
322. See Traynor, Some Open Questions, supra note 14, at 217 (describing the process
by which a court moves from oral argument to issuing a decision). However, Justice Tray-
nor believed it was permissible for the court to frame issues not raised by counsel as long
as the court gives counsel the opportunity to submit additional briefs. Id. at 219.
323. Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 621; Traynor, Reasoning, supra note
218, at 744.
324. Cf. Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 621 (by implication); Traynor,
Reasoning, supra note 218, at 743-744 (by implication).
325. Traynor explained:
Such a tempering process is that of a group, not that of a justice alone. One who
takes part in it knows the marks of battle in the opinions that bear his name. He
ceases to mourn the loss of a frugal phrase that contained his meaning exactly,
and comes to accept the prolix replacement for its easier way with a hard idea.
And he can sometimes rejoice that the questions of others cleared the mists from
his own thinking.
Traynor, Some Open Questions, supra note 14, at 217.
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opinion for all to ponder.326
As we shall see, reason is a central element in Roger Traynor's
theory of the judicial process. 327 His lectures dwell on the reasoning
requirements for appellate opinions and for the orderly development
of law. In 1967 he stated that a new rule announced in an opinion
"must be supported by full disclosure... of all aspects of the problem
and of the data pertinent to its solution. ' 328 A decade later he reem-
phasized that the opinion must be reasoned "every inch of the
way, '329 including, of course, the reasons for the choice of one policy
over another.330 The rigor of Justice Traynor's reasoning require-
ments for an opinion is disclosed by the following advice:
A judge must elucidate painstakingly a decision that involves
the overruling of an earlier one.... If the discarded precedent was
intrinsically unsound from the outset, he must undertake an exposi-
tion of the injustice.., it engendered.... If the discarded decision
has merely become obsolete, he must also specify how it fails to
mesh with contemporary laws or with other judicial rules or
statutes.331
Although the Realists would question the efficacy of these re-
quirements as constraints on judicial creativity, for any decision can be
cast in the language of reason, Justice Traynor obviously believed they
affect both the quality and the result of a court's decision. They con-
strain creativity to the realm of rationality. "Nothing stands against
lunacy in the law," he reminds us, "but the reasoning judge.... 332
And such requirements also counsel caution: "A reasoning judge's
painstaking exploration of place and his sense of pace give reassur-
ance that when he takes an occasional dramatic leap forward he is
impelled to do so in the very interest of orderly progression." 333 Fi-
nally, logic and reason are the tools that allow the other internal con-
straints to function. Without them, lawyers could not persuade judges
and judges could not persuade colleagues to make or reject a pro-
posed new rule. Justice Traynor's rules for reasoning opinions are
thus rigorous forms of Reasoned Elaboration's coherent-articulation-
326. Cf. id. at 218-19 (describing the implications that a dissenter should consider
before recording an opinion).
327. See infra text accompanying notes 347-52.
328. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 205.
329. Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 11.
330. Id. at 12.
331. Id. at 9.
332. Id. at 6.
333. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROGER TRAYNOR
of-reasons principle. 334
Though reason and logic are thus essential parts of the judicial
opinion and the process that produces it, the written-opinion require-
ment produces additional restraints. The process of grinding out the
opinion focuses the judge's inquiry, affects the analysis, and influences
the way the opinion is crafted. "The real test of a solution to a legal
problem," Justice Traynor said, is "whether you [can] put it down con-
vincingly in writing."335 And only by using plain English capable of
being understood by children can the judge penetrate to the heart of
the problem and resolve it convincingly.336 Traynor felt that opinions
containing "repetitions of magic words from the legal lore" signal that
the judge has retreated from the painstaking analysis required for the
task of judging.337
The final group of internal institutional restraints are limitations
produced by the remedies available to the judge: specific decrees and
awards of damages.338 These remedies restrict the judge's creative
powers to the type of disputes traditionally resolved by courts. It is
partly because of the limited remedies available to the court that Jus-
tice Traynor, for example, cautioned that judges should not be zealous
reformers. "The larger a social problem before a court," he reminds
us, "the greater is the risk of an unmanageable solution. '339
334. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
335. Transcript of Interview with Donald P. Barrett, supra note 223, at 3.
336. Justice Traynor would occasionally admonish his law clerks to "'write it (referring
to the clerk's draft of the opinion) so Joe or Mike could understand.' These were his two
young children at the time." Id at 21.
337. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 205. It is interesting to compare
Justice Traynor's opinion-writing style with his off-bench writing style. Donald P. Barrett
notes that Justice Traynor's
style of writing an opinion was entirely different from the style he might use in
writing a speech or a law review article. He would never put some of those titles
in an opinion. He was very reluctant to have anything flip or humorous in an
opinion. You didn't try to put anything like that in an opinion because it would
get stricken out. Since he so thoroughly indoctrinated me in how an opinion
should be written, I never had any success in trying to help to write any speeches.
Sometimes I could get him some legal material he could use but as far as drafting
them that was a totally different world.
Transcript of Interview with Donald P. Barrett, supra note 223, at 3; see also Roth, supra
note 10, at 300-01.
338. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 282.
339. Id.
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g. External Institutional Restraints
The last group of constraints on judicial law-making is created by
the anticipated scrutiny the opinion will receive once it is published3 40
The opinion potentially must pass muster with the public, the press,
the bar, and the academy. 341 With his typical good humor, Justice
Traynor noted, for example,
Scholars inspect the output of the appellate process as if it were
dynamite, and they comment exhaustively on innocuous defects as
well as on patent dangers. There are law journals enough to train
searchlights upon the courts everywhere in the land, and they are
quick to note the errant ways of appellate decision from the most
righteous sentimentalism to the most wrongheaded standpattism. 342
And, in a similar vein, he observed that an opinion, if possible, should
allay the suspicion of any man in the street who regards knowledge
of the law as no excuse for making it. There is usually someone
among them alert to note any misunderstanding of the problem, any
error in reasoning, any irrelevance in data, any oversight of relevant
data, any premature cartography beyond the problem at hand.
Every opinion is thus subject to approval. It is understandable
when a judge, faced with running such a gauntlet, marks time in-
stead on the line of least resistance and lets bad enough alone. 343
340. An opinion should aim at convincing the losing party that justice is done despite
her loss. But for our purpose here, other than the legal procedures such as a request for
rehearing, scrutiny by the losing party is thought to ensure that some members of the bar
(the lawyers for the losing party) and at least one member of the public (the losing party)
will scrutinize the opinion.
341. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 205. "There is usually someone
among them alert to note any misunderstanding of the problem, any error in reasoning,
any irrelevance in data, any oversight of relevant data, any premature cartography beyond
the problem at hand. Every opinion is thus subject to approval." Id.; see also Traynor,
Honorable Law Reviews, supra note 223, at 8-10 (discussing the enthusiasm law reviews
show in critiquing opinions).
342. Traynor, Unguarded Affairs, supra note 178, at 486. Justice Traynor's observation
of the impact of scholarly comment on the judicial process, made in the same lecture, is
worth noting:
There is no way of measuring the effect of constant law review critiques on the
appellate process. Nevertheless, the increasing reference to them in opinions and
briefs indicates that they are carrying increasing weight with judges and lawyers
alike. It is no modern judge who still prides himself on some obscurely stated
rapport with the reported authorities that in his mind render other learning ex-
pendable. It is no modern lawyer who still disdains the critiques, content to rest
easy in hard cases with the undemonstrative Shepherds of the what-has-been,
with all that has been indiscriminately stuffed into the overstuffed concept called
authority. There is a pall on the once formidable Confrerie de Chevaliers Pontifi-
caux in the practicing bar given to heeding and speaking no preachments other
than what they have practiced.
Id. at 487; see also Traynor, Honorable Law Reviews, supra note 224 (praising the prolifera-
tion of law reviews).
343. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 744.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROGER TRAYNOR
It is here that reason again performs a vital function: It provides
the standard by which the opinion, and the judge who wrote it, may be
evaluated by the reader. A court's power and influence, and the repu-
tation of the judge crafting the opinion, depends upon the skill with
which it is reasoned, for that is the universal measure of disinterested
decision-making. "Sustained, impartial . . . criticism of [a court's]
opinions would deter decisions made through excess or by fiat." 3"
On the other hand, a well-reasoned, well-tempered opinion "may
serve to quicken public respect for the law as an instrument of
justice."345
The same may be said for its author. The accountability that
flows from the publication of the opinion, though unmeasurable, is
one of the important countervailing forces in Justice Traynor's philos-
ophy of the judicial process.346
Stare decisis, the common law tradition, the tenet of lag, the ret-
roactive effect of judicial decisions, deference to the legislature, and
internal and external institutional constraints are the forces of repose
and the major constraints on judicial creativity. We now turn to the
power that mediates between the forces of creativity and the forces of
restraint.
(4) Reason and the Art of Creative Judging
Reason plays a central role in Justice Traynor's philosophy.347 It
is the power that mediates between the creative and the restraining
forces. Reminiscent of statements made by Coke and Blackstone, Jus-
tice Traynor calls reason "the soul of law, ' '348 and he constantly refers
to the "reasoning judge, '349 to "the rational development of the
344. White, supra note 145, at 291.
345. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 204. Public scrutiny of a court's
opinion may, of course, be less than completely rational. See; ag., Roger J. Traynor, Law-
breakers, Courts, and Law-Abiders, 31 Mo. L. Rlv. 181, 194-96, 200-01 (1966) (discussing
public criticism of the judicial response to crime).
346. Traynor, Unguarded Affairs, supra note 178, at 487.
347. Donald P. Barrett, who worked closely with Justice Traynor from 1948 until Tray-
nor retired, said:
I think Judge Traynor liked to believe that if you worked hard enough you could
find the only right answer to every case. Now, I think he must have known some-
times he just had to make up his own mind. Sometimes there is no way you can
say this is or that is the right answer, but certainly before he reached that point he
wanted to be sure he had completely exhausted every available avenue.
Transcript of Interview with Donald P. Barrett, supra note 223, at 4.
348. Traynor, Judicial Creativity, supra note 202, at 7.
349. Id. at 6; Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 743.
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law," 350 and to "judicial reasoning. '351 "A government of laws," he
writes, "suggests an ideal, a legal process as rational in all its ramifica-
tions as it has traditionally been in the courts. '352
With reason as both the catalyst and the caldron, the judge as-
sesses the mixture of forces presented in the case. The individual fac-
tors, the elements of creativity and constraint, push and pull against
each other until an equilibrium is reached. This equilibrium is the
judgment on the issue in dispute. All of the factors, of course, are not
present in each case; and even when they are, a different result may be
reached because of a change in their relative weights. Ideally, in Jus-
tice Traynor's world, each judge calculates the point of equilibrium on
each issue in the case. The product of these individual calculations,
produced by the same process of give and take, represents the final
joint calculation-the judgment of the court.353
When the calculus favors restraint, the opinion is traditionally
couched in terms of precedent and stare decisis. There is no change in
doctrine. When the creative forces prevail, the law changes or new
law is made. The calculus also dictates the direction of the change.
When the creative forces are joined by powerful forces of repose, the
law changes to what it was at some time in the past. When the crea-
tive forces strongly predominate, new law emerges. But, in Justice
Traynor's view, it is never entirely new.354 The forces of repose are
always present and influential. New judge-made law is thus always
rooted in the common law. 355 Like a new child, it owes its existence to
its parental past and it carries the genetic code of its ancestors into the
future. "Rational lawmaking," Justice Traynor explained,
involves far more than case by case response to such dramatic
changes as have characterized our century .... We should not for-
get that in deciding hard cases in new fields, a court is the one insti-
tution entrusted by peace-loving people to envisage a beneficent
evolution of law for the long run. It must guard against the danger
that evolution will take an ugly turn, back to an age of dim-eyed
creatures grounded in dogma or off course to an age of bats in blind
pursuit of panaceas.356
350. E.g., Roger J. Traynor, Some Not So Lost Causes of Action, 22 Sw. L.J. 551, 566
(1968).
351. Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 203; Traynor, Reasoning, supra note
218, at 742.
352. Traynor, Statutes, supra note 219, at 427.
353. See supra note 325 and accompanying text; see also Traynor, Judicial Creativity,
supra note 202, at 6-7.
354. See, e.g., Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections, supra note 14, at 258-59.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 283.
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Reason is thus the transmitter of the genetic code, the atomic force
that binds the elements of law together. As Justice Traynor said:
[The judge] invariably looks for precedent as his starting point. He
is constrained to arrive at a judgment in the context of ancestraljudicial experience: the given judgments; or lacking these, the given
dicta; or lacking these, the given clues. Even if his search of the past
yields nothing, so that he confronts a truly unprecedented case, he
still arrives at a judgment in the context of judicial reasoning with
recognizable ties to the past. By that kinship, a judgment not only
establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent for the future,
but integrates it into the often rewoven, but always durable network
of common law.357
This is not meant to suggest that Traynor's theory employs a
grand multiple regression formula that produces the correct legal rule
when all of the relevant factors are included and are assigned their
proper weight. When judges make law, they exercise their own power
of choice. But that choice is not arbitrary, not irrational, and not
based upon the personal interests of the judge. It is the product of
"professional skill,... legal reasoning and legal imagination," 358 after
deep inquiry and "reflection enough to arrive at last at a value judg-
ment as to what the law ought to be."359 In other words, judges exer-
cise judicial, not personal, choice when they make new law.
V. Conclusion
We have followed the main currents in legal thought during
Roger Traynor's formative years to give us a perspective on his judi-
cial philosophy, and to provide a foundation for assessing its impor-
tance. We have seen the reaction of Holmes, Cardozo, Pound, and the
Realists to classical doctrine and how their views influenced Traynor's
judicial philosophy. Using their theories as raw material, Justice Tray-
nor created an elaborate philosophy of the judicial process. Judges
357. ld. at 262.
358. Traynor, La Rude Vita, supra note 179, at 234-35. This idea was repeated verbatim
in Traynor, The Interweavers, supra note 180, at 213.
359. Traynor, La Rude Vita, supra note 179, at 234. The quotation continues as follows:
When at last he reaches a juncture where he feels bound to commit himself to one
value judgment or another, the intellectual quest merges with a yearning for
something more than the mere orderly disposition of problems, a yearning often
approximately defined as a sense of justice and culminating in what Edmond
Cahn calls The Moral Decision. ... We should be aware of how difficult it is to
come by. As Harry Jones sensitively observes, "just decision requires both an
intellect that perceives the good and a will that resolutely perseveres in the good
course intellectually perceived."
Id. at 235.
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make law, they do not find it. In doing so they exercise individual
judicial choice. The law they make, like all law, is essentially indeter-
minate, and in a constant state of potential flux so that it may meet the
felt necessities of the time. Furthermore, the courts in our common
law system are partners with the legislatures in the law-making enter-
prise, though legislatures hold the trumping power. Finally, this part-
nership in the law-making enterprise is an essential element of our
democracy. But Traynor's judicial philosophy goes well beyond the
grand legacy left by countless judges of the common law, and by
Holmes, Cardozo, Pound, and the Realists.
Holmes never shared with us his entire philosophy of the judicial
process, and the Realists focused on demolishing classical theory and
practice without articulating a positive theory of the judicial process.
Pound ultimately joined the critics of Realism, and Cardozo never ad-
dressed the issues they raised. The Reasoned Elaborationists began
developing a theory of institutional constraints that would address the
Realist criticism that judges exercise personal choice when they make
law, but they were diverted by the critics of Realism into focusing on
the substantive principles that judges should use in constitutional
adjudication.
Justice Traynor rejected Reasoned Elaboration's substantive
principles. Instead, he created a complete judicial philosophy that was
at once profoundly conservative and profoundly dynamic. The con-
servative elements, those elements that I have called the forces of re-
pose, are juxtaposed against the dynamic elements, those elements I
have called the creative forces. The judge's decision in any case repre-
sents the point of equilibrium reached by assessing the relative
strength of these various counterbalancing forces as they appear in the
case at hand. Because of the forces of repose, which include institu-
tional restraints of awesome force, and the personal integrity of the
judge, a judge's law-making choice is judicial, rather than personal,
and fully compliant with the principles of our democracy. Traynor's
reply to the Realist claim that a judge's law-making choice is inevita-
bly personal is thus to distinguish between the judicial office, which is
constrained by the forces of repose, and the judicial officer, who is
personally restrained by self-conscious reason and integrity and by the
environment in which the choice is made. Even if a judge puts per-
sonal integrity aside and seeks to exercise purely personal choice in
making new law, the forces of repose make it nearly impossible to
succeed. Judges must, for example, convert their personal choice into
the rhetoric of the law and convince their colleagues to agree on a
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decision that rationally explains the result in the terms of legal princi-
ples. Any purely personal judgment that survives the judicial process
does not justify embracing the myth of classical law-finding theory,
nor does it warrant abandoning our common law heritage.
"The real danger," Justice Traynor warned,
is not that judges might take off onward and upward, but that all too
many of them have long since stopped dead in the tracks of their
predecessors, with whom they consistently identify themselves save
perhaps on the wearing of wigs. They would command little atten-
tion were it not that they speak the appealing language of stability
in justification of specious formulas.
360
Justice Traynor's judicial philosophy currently stands as one of
the most complete theories of the judicial process created in the latter
half of this century. Traynor's philosophy effectively responds to the
personal-choice dilemma, and embraces nearly all of Legal Realism's
basic beliefs. Furthermore, it is more relevant to the judicial process
of our time than the judicial philosophy of Benjamin Cardozo. In-
deed, at a time when legislatures seem too compliant with the whim of
the day, it is all the more important that our judges continue to weave
the fabric of the law. It is critical that judges, lawyers, law students,
and the lay public understand and agree upon the law-making role of
judges in our democracy. There is no better place to begin than with
the judicial philosophy of Roger Traynor.
360. Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 621. The same quote appears, sub-
stantially unaltered, in Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 218, at 744. In an earlier portion of
his article, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, Traynor wrote:
As judges analyze issues that have been disputed every inch of the way, they learn
to guard against premature judgment. Entrusted with decisions, bound to hurt
one litigant or the other, they come to understand the court's responsibility in
terms not of power but of obligation. The danger is not that they will exceed their
power, but that they will fall short of their obligation.
Traynor, No Magic Words, supra note 168, at 620.
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Appendix A
Justice Traynor's twenty-four articles on the judicial process,
which are listed in the order in which they were published, are as
follows:
1. Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society,
1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230 (lecture given on the occasion of dedicating the
new College of Law building at the University of Illinois on April 13,
1956).
2. Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Ap-
pellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (1957) (address given before
the University of Chicago Law School's Conference on Judicial Ad-
ministration on November 8, 1956).
3. Roger J. Traynor, Unjustifiable Reliance, 42 MINN. L. REV. 11,
(1957) (address delivered May 2, 1957, at the University of Minnesota
Law School Banquet honoring Professor Henry Rottschaefer).
4. Roger J. Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U.
PA. L. REV. 635 (1958) (paper presented at the Jurisprudence Round
Table on Jerome Frank's Fact Skepticism, sponsored by the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools as a memorial to Judge Frank at its
meeting in San Francisco, December 29, 1957).
5. Roger J. Traynor, Comment, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND
TOMORROW 48, 62-64 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959) (address given
at the Conference celebrating the Centennial of the Columbia Univer-
sity Law School on November 6, 1958).
6. Roger J. Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm of Rea-
son, 7 UTAH L. REV. 157 (1960) (first Annual William H. Leary Lec-
ture in Salt Lake City on November 10, 1960).
7. Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CAL. L.
REV. 615 (1961) (first annual Walter Perry Johnson Lecture on Law
and Public Affairs, University of California at Berkeley, April 22,
1961).
8. Roger J. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; Or Hard Cases
Can Make Good Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223 (1962) (address deliv-
ered at the University of Chicago Law School, October 3, 1961).
9. Roger J. Traynor, Better Days in Court for a New Day's Problems,
17 VAND. L. REV. 109 (1963) (address given at the dedication of the
new building at Vanderbilt Law School, Spring, 1963).
10. Roger J. Traynor, To the Right Honorable Law Reviews, 10 UCLA
L. REV. 3 (1962) (invited paper dedicating the tenth anniversary issue
of the UCLA Law Review).
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11. Roger J. Traynor, The Unguarded Affairs of the Semikempt Mis-
tress, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1965) (Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lec-
ture, delivered November 12, 1964, under the auspices of the
Pennsylvania Chapter of the Order of the Coif and the University of
Pennsylvania Law School).
12. Roger J. Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts, and Law-Abiders, 31 Mo.
L. REv. 181 (1966) (fourteenth annual Earl F. Nelson Memorial Lec-
ture, March 4, 1966).
13. Roger J. Traynor, The Supreme Court's Watch on the Law, in 2 J.
JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF CALIFOR-
NIA, 1900-1950, at 207 (1966)
14. Roger J. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, 21 ARK. L.
REV. 287 (1967) (address delivered at the University of Arkansas
School of Law, May 9, 1967).
15. Roger J. Traynor, Conflict of Laws in Time: The Sweep of New
Rules in Criminal Law, 1967 DUKE L.J. 713 (Brainerd Currie Lecture
delivered at the Duke Law School, May 11, 1967).
16. Roger J. Traynor, The Courts: Interweavers in the Reformation of
Law, 32 SASK. L. REv. 201 (1967) (address given at a symposium on
law reform held in conjunction with the official opening of the Law
Building at the University of Saskatchewan, September 23, 1967).
17. Roger J. Traynor, What Domesday Books for Emerging Law?, 15
UCLA L. REv. 1105 (1968) (address delivered at the dedication cere-
monies for the new wing of the UCLA School of Law).
18. Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17
CATH. U. L. REv. 401 (1968) (fourth annual Pope John Lecture, Cath-
olic University, March 20, 1968).
19. Roger J. Traynor, Some Not So Lost Causes of Action, 22 Sw. L.J.
551 (1968) (annual lecture in tribute to Robert G. Storey, Dean Emer-
itus of the Southern Methodist University School of Law).
20. Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV.
739 (1970) (Law Day address at the University of Virginia, May 2,
1970).
21. Roger J. Traynor, The Mind Counts, 20 CATH. U. L. REV. 259
(1970) (commentary delivered at the 47th annual meeting of the
American Law Institute, May 22, 1970).
22. Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question
of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977) (originally
presented as a lecture in 1975 at the University of Birmingham).
23. Roger J. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IowA L.
REV. 1 (1977) (Murray Lecture at the University of Iowa College of
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Law, March 31, 1977).
24. Roger J. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections on Leeways and Limits
of Appellate Courts, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 255 (essay providing Ameri-
can perspective delivered September 11, 1979, at a colloquium on
methods of law reform, held at the University of Warwick, Coventry,
England).
